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Executive Summary
Ninety percent of the world’s trade goods travel by surface transportation, using maritime, road
and rail assets.2 The security of the goods in transit, the infrastructure supporting the movement,
and the vehicles are all required to ensure that international commerce proceeds successfully. The
criticality of the global supply chains to the economies of most nations makes their study essential,
yet to date, the focus has been on individual modes of transportation. But today’s large container
ships, complex port operations and carefully choreographed forward movement of the cargo
require a more integrated approach to understanding how to improve the security of the surface
transportation supply chain.
Much has been written about the surface supply chain itself and the need for security and resiliency,
but little has focused on the security of the integrated components of the system. Ports with super
cranes that time the arrival of trucks and the dispersal of goods require less than an hour in a port,
making it impossible to x-ray or inspect every container. Efficiency has the potential to weaken
security steps in surface transportation supply chain management, yet ending human trafficking,
drug trafficking and inventory shrinkage during movement from producer to consumer also
requires new technologies and approaches to ensure security. Numerous global factors, ranging
from geo-political conflicts to climate change, are creating new challenges. The melting of the
Arctic Ocean’s ice sheets, for example, is opening up new trade routes through treacherous waters,
involving mineral extraction activities that threaten the pristine environment.
While these potentials for interference are just new and more sophisticated versions of longstanding trade challenges, the introduction of information technology into the integral operation
of the vehicles in the supply chain poses novel challenges. Mega container ships with over 20,000
TEUs are navigated using global positioning systems (GPS) and cyber-based charts. Hacking,
spoofing and malware are new security challenges not experienced when navigation used paper
charts and the stars. Many of the ship’s systems are cyber-based and may be vulnerable to attack
through crew members charging their cell phones or playing games at sea. Super-cranes use cyberbased management to organize containers to move from cargo vessel to trucks with maximum
efficiency, adding a cyber vulnerability to container tracking systems. Chinese introduction of a
new version of GPS in June of 2020 has the potential to greatly enhance the complexity of
navigation.
Terrorism influences decisions about which ships will be allowed in which ports, the types of
licensing and training that the crew members must have, and the routes that ships take. Pirates in
the Straits of Malacca and along the Somali coast continue a long tradition of sea-borne thieves,
creating a rationale for a Chinese Maritime Silk Road system of ports that can accommodate both
commercial vessels and military vessels, such as destroyers. Modern cruise ship and container ship
berths can hold small aircraft carriers.
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The Delphi workshop revealed these and other challenges that require new approaches to security,
not as individual issues but as the integrated space in which the global supply chain operates. A
blueprint was developed from the workshop deliberations to encourage transportation researchers
to undertake these essential areas. It is hoped that it will serve as a useful guide to the development
of proposals for public and private funding sources, for projects that will enhance the global supply
chain’s security, and the economic security of the manufacturers and consumers that rely on it.
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I. Introduction
The global economy relies on surface transportation for its supply chain. A supply chain is “the
socio-technical network that identifies, targets, and fulfills demand. It is the process of deciding
what, when, and how much should move to where.” 3 A review of the scholarly literature suggests
that while surface supply chain security has been studied as an economic and risk management
(insurance) challenge, the integration of the transportation mechanisms, and their role in security,
is often overlooked. Raw materials get moved to factories, and finished products get moved to
consumers, using surface transportation assets of trucks, trains and ships. While air cargo is an
important element in the movement of valuable goods, most of the world’s cargo moves on the
surface for economic reasons, so this research will not address air cargo.
More needs to be understood about how the surface transportation infrastructure can be made
secure in the evolving realities of Arctic Ocean melting, Chinese Belt and Road initiatives, and
cyber networks’ role. More recently, the significance of a pandemic for global supply chain security
became clear as nations competed for medical protective equipment, ventilators and chemical
components for pharmaceuticals and viral test kit reagents.
This project aligns with the Mineta Transportation Institute’s two Research Emphasis Areas, as
follows:
•

Safety and security of transportation systems

•

Intermodal connectivity and integration

This research focused on the multiple modal relationships (usually labelled as intermodal and
multi-modal) that form the international surface transportation-based supply chains in order to
look at ways to enhance the security of all elements of the system as goods pass through it. With
the international focus on climate change and sustainability, the newer term synchromodal is also
being used.
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Table 1. Supply Chain Definitions
Type

Definition

Intermodal

The movement of freight from origin to destination, involving the transfer
from one mode of transport to another, without handling the goods,
characterized by separate ticketing or contract for each mode; also used to
refer to containerized rail transportation. This mode is largely dependent on
rail and maritime due to economies of scale.

Multimodal

The movement of freight from origin to destination, involving the transfer
from one mode of transport to another, without handling the goods, using
one contract for the whole trip; requiring integration between carriers and
terminal operators.

Synchromodal

“The best possible combination of transport modes is selected for each
trip…to minimize cost, delay and CO2 emissions” (Mes and Iacob);
“…synchromodal transport aims at the integration and cooperation among
transport services and modes” (Zhang and Pel). This mode is generally
facilitated by information technology systems.

Sources: Rodrigue and Slack, 2020; Mes and Iacob, 2016; Zhang and Pel, 2015.

Thus, it addresses multiple US Department of Transportation (US DOT) surface modal research
priorities, including highway, motor carrier, railroad and maritime.
However, the US DOT focuses on the functionality of the transportation vehicle and its
communication links in most of its research initiatives, rather than on the interconnectedness of
the system. Furthermore, issues related to the security of the goods in transit are not addressed.
This research focuses on the security of the whole system: the asset being moved (cargo), the asset
doing the moving (truck, train, cargo containers, ship), the asset in which the move is occurring
(port, warehouse), the route that is used, and the security implications for each dimension:
truck/port/ship/cargo/route. Security is viewed in this multi-dimensional frame.
Security analysis frames the question of transportation’s role in supply chain security by examining
issues of likelihood of disruption, frequency of disruption, vulnerability when disruption occurs,
and steps that can be taken to address each vulnerability and prevent or lessen its impact.
Research Questions:
1. What is the scope of existing knowledge in the field? What is the background and current
state of the research in supply chain security’s transportation dimension? What work has
been completed by existing transportation and supply chain scholars and organizations,
and published in either peer reviewed or professional journals? (Bibliography)
2. What are the current issues in the practice of surface transportation supply chain security
(STSCS) that need additional research and development? What is transportation’s role
in supply chain security, protecting all elements of the chain from technological and
human-caused hazards? (Workshop)
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
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3. What practical measures can be adopted by operators and government agencies in order
to enhance the future security and resilience of STSCS? (Blueprint)
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II. Background
2.1 Supply Chain Research
At no time (except for the two world wars) have supply chains been subjected to such challenges
as are evident today. It is increasingly obvious that the global environment that emerged in recent
decades and facilitated the creation of global supply chain networks is undergoing significant
changes, changes that are impacting their transportation systems. These are the essential
components that enable supply chains to operate nationally and internationally. They constitute
the physical link between all the components in any supply chain since raw materials are shipped
to one or more production facilities from where the output is shipped to other nodes and ultimately
to a consumer. Any disruption in any part of these systems has implications not only for the specific
supply chain but for national economies as well. The prosperity of the United States (US), indeed
its security, is dependent upon their effective and efficient functioning.
The central role of transportation and its associated systems in achieving and maintaining a high
level of supply chain security has been clearly recognized by the US government, whose “National
Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security” states: “our focus… is the worldwide network of
transportation, postal, and shipping pathways, assets, and infrastructures by which goods are
moved from the point of manufacture until they reach an end consumer, as well as supporting
communications infrastructure and systems.” 4
Numerous potentially disruptive factors to the existing global supply chain system can be
identified, ranging from shifts in the political and economic balance of power, the rise of non-state
actors, including those who engage in criminal and terrorist activity, the emergence of new political
and economic powers and groupings, the continuing development and global dissemination of
information and other technologies and such environmental factors as climate change.

2.2 Frameworks and Focus
Supply Chain
The globalization of the economy has created new risks for surface transportation supply chain
security (STSCS). Components of products are created in multiple locations, often in multiple
nations, and have to be moved to a location for assembly, then along a different supply chain for
delivery to the consumer sector, which can include another long distribution system. These long
supply chains depend on a variety of transportation modes, facilities and systems, each of which
offers an opportunity for tampering, criminal enterprise and terrorist activity.
In 1999 Lummus and Vokurka defined a supply chain as “a term increasingly used by logistics
professionals—encompasses every effort involved in producing and delivering a final product, from
the supplier’s supplier to the customer’s customer.” 5 Mentzer, DeWitt, Keebler et al. noted in 2011
that a consensus definition of supply chain is critical before managing its elements can be
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
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undertaken. One suggestion is “several independent firms involved…in manufacturing a product
and placing it in the hands of the end user…raw materials and components producers, product
assemblers, wholesalers, retail merchants and transportation companies.” 6
The global impact of supply chains was forcefully demonstrated by the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake
in Japan in 1995, when the impact of the earthquake made it impossible to ship the car brakes
from metropolitan Kobe, closing down Toyota automobile assembly lines in South America. 7 The
world’s supply of lighted electronic diode (LED) lights used in appliances, electronics and
automobiles was also made in the Kobe area, and the shipments were delayed for weeks, holding
up production lines around the world. 8 In both cases, the supply chain was damaged due to the
loss of the relatively new port facility in Kobe that experienced liquefaction, resulting in the quays
sinking and the large gantry cranes subsiding into the bay. The potential alternative supply chain
segment—by road to the Port of Yokohama—was also lost when the Hanshin Expressway fell
over 90 degrees due to lack of sheer strength in the supports. 9
Business literature describes the role of supply chains in the provision of goods around the world,
while this research focuses on one aspect of supply chains: the security of the surface transportation
system moving raw materials to finished products.
Surface Transportation
Surface transportation includes multiple modes. Water transportation supply chain elements
include ports, harbor pilots, cranes, cargo containers and various types of ships and barges. Land
transportation supply chain elements include trucks, terminals, roads and bridges, fuel and repair
facilities, and traffic control devices. Rail transportation supply chain elements include freight
depots, railroad infrastructure and signals. Ancillary systems include warehouses and customs
facilities, and information technology applications including SCADA systems, maritime
navigation, communications across the modes, and scheduling programs to achieve synchronous
modal goods movement.
These work in concert to move goods from the raw materials’ source to the manufacturing point,
to the port, onto the ship. At the receiving port, goods are transferred to rail or truck for further
delivery to wholesalers and retailers,10 or to the other end of the US “land bridge” 11 connecting
cargo from China to consumers in Europe. Cargo is loaded onto another ship in an East Coast
port bound for European ports. 12 All these cargo transfers occur without the finished goods being
handled except as a sealed container, eliminating the need for stevedores at the port and inventory
“shrinkage” through loss and theft at intervening transfer points.
Definitions of Security
Workshop participants noted that in many languages, safety and security are expressed by the same
word, yet there is a distinct difference between the two concepts. Safety relates to the prevention
of accidental damage to an asset. Accidents can be studied to understand which system failed or
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what misjudgment was made by a human in the use or operation of a device, system or vehicle,
and training or redesign can be implemented to prevent a repetition of the accident in the future.
Security, on the other hand, involves protecting something valuable from any form of deliberate
interference, usually requiring a physical response to an external conscious threat, whether
technological or human caused.13 Security systems may be established to respond to a loss of the
power source, loss of cyber services, crime, or terrorism. Security must also be ready to respond to
the impact of pandemics on supply chains, including the disruption of the supply chain through
workers’ illness or through quarantine orders, leaving valuable goods unattended in unprotected
places, 14 creating vulnerabilities that may be exploited.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) set up a system of capturing raw threats via
the trucking industry using State Threat Assessment Centers as gathering points for threats.
Thousands of reports are generated every year from the transportation sectors. The Intermodal
Security Training and Exercise Program (I-Step) has involved more than 3,345 participants “from
the nation’s mass transit, freight rail, highway, and pipeline sectors,” 15 but their focus has been
more on homeland security and counter-terrorism than intermodal vulnerabilities in the systems
themselves.
Currently, the drug cartels in Northern Mexico are using a river model to smuggle drugs across
the border. They break the shipment down into 10 to 15-kilo loads rather than larger
consignments that would have a greater impact on their operation if intercepted. With this
disbursed model, shipments that are seized have a small or insignificant impact on their operations.
As such, their primary concern, from a security perspective, is the interception of this river of drugs
by a rival group. Since something else is being used as the cover to smuggle their cargo, that item
falls under the protection of the cartel by default, meaning that security for certain vehicles is
covered by not only law enforcement but also criminal enterprise.
Access to surface transportation routes, lines and ports is critical for the elements of the supply
chain. Goods need to move through the supply chain with as few impediments as possible. Supply
chain management is focused on keeping down the time and cost of goods movement and
minimizing the release of greenhouse gasses (GHG), each of which creates an argument against
barriers within the supply chain. However, inspections of goods and bills of lading, and sampling
contents of containers, may be required to meet national customs requirements, prevent human
trafficking and deter drug transportation. Each barrier and inspection adds time to the supply
chain, and potentially adds cost and GHG emissions. 16
New Elements of STSCS
China’s “Belt and Road” project is explicitly designed to develop new trade routes and economic
spheres of influence to challenge existing economic patterns, which have been traditionally
centered around the US, the European Union (EU), and Japan. Its two dimensions, one designed
to enhance transportation from China across Central Asia to Europe, the other developing port
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
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and related infrastructure to create new maritime routes, represent the largest and costliest
investments and infrastructure development in history and ranges across Asia, Europe, Africa, the
Middle East, and the Americas. 17
This infrastructure-building plan includes the construction of new trade routes and resources in
areas not currently served or needing enhancements. Examples include a new Maritime Silk Road
that would connect China to the Mediterranean Sea through a series of new or enhanced ports, an
enhanced rail line that connects China to Europe through connections in Kazakhstan, Poland and
into Spain, and road and rail construction projects across the Eastern Hemisphere. In some cases,
the partnerships are joint ventures, while in other cases, the receiving nation borrows funds from
China and uses the funds to pay Chinese enterprises to build the facilities. Particular concern has
been raised about South Pacific island nations that have borrowed large amounts that they may be
unable to repay. 18
Melting of the Arctic Ocean’s ice has permitted Russia to open areas of its north shore to extraction
industries and allowed for the passage of a container ship for several months each summer. There
are concerns about the use of the Bering Strait, the only access from the Pacific Ocean to the Arctic
Ocean, for increased commercial shipping, due to its narrow passages. The Arctic Sea is rough,
and even when there is open water, there is also sea ice, requiring the presence of ice pilots on ships
transiting the area.19 Environmentalists worry that accidents could result in fuel spills leading to
pollution in an area that is difficult to access and with limited rescue capacity. 20
Information technology (IT) is being applied to all aspects of the surface transportation supply
chain, pointing out the need for enhanced cybersecurity for the supply chain enterprise. IT has
long been a staple in transportation management, from supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCACA) systems that run the railroads to enterprise-wide systems that schedule port calls and
freight forwarding, to communications systems such as voice over internet protocol (VOIP), email
and signaling operations, and geographical positioning systems (GPS) that geo-locate vehicles on
their routes and navigate ships at sea. Every one of these systems is potentially subject to hacking
by hostile actors, disrupting economies, and even endangering lives. 21 Technology is impacting an
increasingly wide range of transportation operations, such as enabling super cranes in ports, 22 but
every technological advance based on cyber-based functionalities also opens the door for hacking,
damage and ransomware attacks.23
Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the damage that can be done to the
supply chain’s security, as port terminals are shuttered, leaving empty containers and chassis in
warehouses instead of being shipped back to Asia. Illness in China caused a major slowdown in
factory production, leading to the cancellation of sailings to the US ports, causing unemployment
throughout the US portion of the supply chain’s transportation sector.24 Tires on the deck of a ship
sailing from Africa to the US east coast are believed to have unwittingly imported mosquitoes
carrying infectious diseases that were new to the Western Hemisphere, such as Zika. 25 All of these
events point to a need for enhanced security for the idled infrastructure, to ensure that it is not
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tampered with or stolen and ready for the anticipated resurgence in business when COVID-19 is
overcome, 26 and for vigilance in the operation of the supply chain.

2.3 Research on Transportation Supply Chain Security
Considerable research and implementation work has already been undertaken on aspects of supply
chain security with a nexus to transportation. For example, a chronological collection of some
current relevant works from the Transportation Research Board’s Transportation Research
Database (TRID) is found in Table 2. However, most focus on just one mode, such as maritime,
or look at one security issue across multiple modes, such as prevention of tampering.
Table 2. Chronological Examples of Related Scholarly Articles from TRID
Scenario analysis and disaster preparedness for port and maritime logistics risk management. 2019. Kwesi-Buor,
John, Menachof, David A., and Talas, Risto. Accident Analysis & Prevention, Volume 123, Issue 0, 2019,
pp. 433–447. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0001457516302421
Utilization Rate as a Resilience Index for Supply Chain Networks, 2019. Al Hajj Hassan, Lama, Chen, Ying,
Mahmassani, Hani S. Transportation Research Board 98th Annual Meeting, 2019, 10p.
Risk and Failure Resilience of Interdependent Transportation Systems, 2018, Yodo, Nita, Wang, Pingfeng,
Krishnan, Krishna, and Twomey, Janet. https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/36552
The Use of Violence in Cargo Theft: A Supply Chain Disruption Case. 2018. Ekwall, Daniel, and Lantz, Björn.
Journal of Transportation Security, Volume 11, Issue 1–2, 2018, pp 3–21.
Next steps for CTPAT: CBP’s post-9/11 supply chain security program is ready for an update, but industry
remains concerned about implementing changes. Caldwell, Stephen L. American Shipper, 2018, pp. 30–35
Security of Air Cargo Shipments, Operations, and Facilities. 2018. Elias, Bart. Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC United States
Exploring Blockchain - Technology Behind Bitcoin and Implications for Transforming Transportation, 2018,
Rajbhandari, Rajat. Texas A&M Transportation Institute. https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/34863
Source: Transportation Research Board, 2020. TRID. Retrieved from trid.trb.org

Research into the supply chain management literature revealed that over 40,000 books and articles
had been published between 1982 and 2015. Yet, only one of the popular supply chain
management textbooks dealt with transportation as a “promising future research area” in the supply
chain’s security, sustainability, risk or disruption studies.27 In the field of supply chain risk
management, there were 143 articles published between 2003 and 2013, yet only one article dealt
with transportation. 28
International scholars have created volumes that focus on supply chain risks and the security issues
confronting transportation systems. Zamparini and Szyliowicz, 29 for example, have co-edited and
co-authored three volumes that look at how different nations deal with maritime, aviation and
multimodal security issues. The Mineta Transportation Institute workshop 30 that brought together
academics, security officials and supply chain professionals considered how the rapidly changing
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global environment impacts the security of surface transportation supply chain systems. This is a
topic that is receiving increasing academic attention. Recently, a group of international academics
presented papers on various dimensions of this topic at the University of Salentino, and in Sweden,
Per Hilletofth (Jonkoping University), organized a special session entitled “Next Generation
Intermodal Transportation Systems” at the 9th International Conference on Operations and Supply
Chain Management in December 2019 in Vietnam. 31
Yet, macro risks to surface transportation supply chain management exist in a number of spheres.
At the geo-political level, nationalism and populism are clearly playing an increasing role in the
politics of many nations, as evidenced by the United Kingdom’s decision to exit the EU, leading
to the need to create a 27-acre truck parking facility in Kent to process the 215 million customs
declarations that will be required for cross-border transport of good from the European Union, at
the cost of 7 billion British Pounds. 32 Another example is the “America First” policies advocated
by the American President, as exemplified by the rejection of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and the new patterns of economic relations with China and other states. 33 The implications of
these developments for existing trade patterns are not only being widely discussed but are already
leading to changes within the global trading system as countries—and companies—seek to adjust
to this new environment.
Furthermore, the power balance is changing as new economic powers have been emerging,
including Brazil, India and China. As a result, new trade patterns are developing—and will
continue to develop—with obvious implications for the location and structure of supply chains.
These developments will be spurred by the policies regarding their transportation infrastructure
that some countries are considering or have already adopted. Panama, for example, recently
completed its expansion of the canal. Nicaragua is still considering the possibility of building a
rival canal, and many African states are exploring ways to expand and integrate their railroad
systems.34 Nor can one overlook the problems caused by the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East
and elsewhere, which pose obvious security challenges in the form of terrorism and piracy.
At the environmental level, climate change is already an important factor. It has affected the
production of various agricultural products throughout the world, threatens the functioning of
some ports through sea level rises, and the melting Arctic Ocean’s ice sheet is reopening the fabled
Northwest Passage between Europe and Asia.
Business writers credit a major earthquake in Japan in March of 2011 and flooding in Thailand at
the end of 2011 for increasing the interest of globalized firms in understanding and assessing
threats of losses to their supply chains. Supply chain impacts were estimated at $300 billion for the
earthquake and $50 billion from the floods, with significant supply chain disruption. 35 Zurich
Global Insurance surveyed its customers and discovered that 85% had experienced some supply
chain disruption in 2011, with 50% reporting more than one disruption. Factors driving this
experience included the “globalized nature of the supply chain, just-in-time inventory
management, consolidation of vendors through strategic sourcing activities, and overall geoMINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
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political changes.” 36 All of these involve some role for transportation, yet transportation is never
mentioned.

2.4 Bibliographic Research on Transportation Security
This research has developed a bibliography of current academic and related works to support an
understanding of transportation’s role in the supply chain security effort in order to provide a more
comprehensive look at the interactions of goods, mode, modal interface and routes. It contains 113
works, of which 31% address the maritime sector, 8% address land transportation, and 53% address
general transportation. Ships are the focus of 27% of the literature, 8% focus on land vehicles, 2%
are about trains, and 4% are about trucks.
Security and risk assessments are a central focus for 65% of the articles, while 35% consider that
these are management issues; 43% of the articles consider risk a high concern, 8% a moderate
concern, 18% only a low concern, and 38% suggest that risk varies over time. It is notable that
interest in external threats and vulnerabilities of the supply chain has risen over time, with interest
developing in 2012 and accelerating after 2017.
The bibliography also reveals how the literature considers the variety of risk factors that can impact
supply chain transportation systems. While 14% of threats to supply chain security come from
organizational sources such as globalization and just-in-time management (listed above), 23% are
from the threat of terrorist attack, 13% from natural disasters, 9% from geo-political factors, and
12% from crime and piracy. These and other findings are discussed in detail below in the section
entitled “Bibliography Development and Literature Review.”
One strategy for defeating criminal enterprise and terrorism is to understand how the potential
perpetrators think. To this end, an additional bibliography of adversary literature was developed
to inform researchers of the challenges to security plans and systems. This second bibliography
includes the open source materials created by and about former criminals, national government
agencies and terrorist organizations. It, too, is discussed in detail below.

2.5 Challenges to STSCS
New Economic Actors
The globalization of the economy has created a variety of new challenges for STSCS. While
China’s role in the world economy has grown significantly, Brazil, India and Vietnam have grown
in economic importance internationally. The latest World Bank report shows the US with a $20
trillion GDP economy, China in second place with $13 trillion, India at #7 with $2.7 trillion, and
Brazil at #9 with $1.8 trillion. Vietnam has breached the top 50 economies barrier (out of over 200
that are rated), at #46 with $2.5 billion. 37 It is notable that the balance of GDP has shifted
regionally as well. The world economy was at $86 trillion in 2018, with the Asian Pacific region
in the lead at $25.9 trillion through the powerhouse economies of China (#2), Japan (#3), and
South Korea (#12), along with other smaller nations. Europe and Central Asia are at $23 trillion,
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with Germany (#4), the United Kingdom (#5) and France (#6), Italy (#8) and the Russian
Federation (#11) leading the region. North America is third with $22 trillion, including the US
(#1), Canada (#10) and Mexico (#15) as the partners. 38
This level of economic activity is based on globalized trade. In 2018 the US imported $539 billion
in goods from China (#2 GDP), $142 billion from Japan (#3 GDP), $74 billion from South Korea
(#12 GDP), and $49 billion from Vietnam (#49), among its larger trading partners, and all with a
negative imbalance of trade. On a worldwide basis, in 2018, the US imported $2.5 trillion and
exported $1.6 trillion in goods, 39 causing the US Chamber of Commerce to note that many of the
11 million cargo containers unloaded in US ports each year return to China empty. 40 Of the top
ten busiest ports in the world, five, including Shanghai (#1), are in China, with Singapore #2,
Hong Kong #5, Busan, Korea #6, and Dubai #9. Shanghai handles 37.17 million twenty-foot
equivalent units (TEUs) each year,41 while the largest port in the US is Los Angeles, handling 8.8
million TEUs, followed by Long Beach with 6.77 million TEUs annually. East Asian trade
accounts for 90% of the cargo passing through Long Beach. 42
China has initiatives to enhance its position as a worldwide trading partner. In 2010 it launched
an initiative called “Made in China 2025” aimed at expanding its economic reach. The plan
specifies “ten sectors, including aerospace, new materials and agricultural equipment,” with
development supported by “state guided funds,” essentially subsidies that are illegal under World
Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 43
New Technologies
Technology continues to produce and disseminate new products, ranging from drones to
autonomous and connected vehicles to data technologies that will probably impact existing supply
chains and their transportation systems to an even greater degree than the container revolution did
a few decades ago. While these technologies are in various stages of development and use, there is
little doubt that they already have impacted and will continue to impact, the existing legal,
regulatory, and security environments. Indeed, the consequences for transportation security are
already widely felt, as cyber-attacks against supply chain and transportation companies have
become commonplace, and cybersecurity has become a major national concern.
A variety of new transportation technologies are being introduced into the STSCS environment.
Some, such as the cyber-enabled high-speed gantry cranes at ports, have cut down on GHG
emissions through better management of goods movements. The cyber system permits the crane
operator to “groom” the cargo on the ship to create the most efficient supply chain, enabling trucks
to be loaded and released in under one hour. 44 New hull designs and the use of hybrid propulsion
systems can reduce GHG emissions in ships, and new fuels such as biofuel, liquefied natural gas
(LNG) and hydrogen are cleaner fuels than traditional bunker oil. The increase in ship capacity
also lowers the emissions per TEU, which is important as the quantity of containers shipped
annually continues to grow. 45 These changes may contribute to STSCS by creating quicker and

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

13

less polluting trips, but the new fuels could instead provide new challenges securing the new fuel
sources.
Trucks carry more than 70% of America’s freight. 46 They collect containers at ports and drop them
off at railheads, warehouses, depots, or carry the goods to the factory. Self-driving trucks are on
the horizon, with test drives having begun in March 2020. Locomotion, a self-driving truck firm,
organizes their vehicles to drive in convoys, limiting the impact on other drivers. The first test
drives carried freight between Oregon and Idaho for 400 miles. A human drives the lead truck,
and cameras, lidar and radar keep the following trucks in their lane.47 The trucking industry has
suffered a driver shortage since 2003. Convoyed trucks with one human driver could double the
capacity that one driver can manage. California has already issued 65 Autonomous Vehicle Testing
Licenses to trucking companies, and an autonomous truck drove 2,800 miles in 41 hours from
Tulare, California, to Quakertown, Pennsylvania, with a load of 41,000 pounds of butter in time
for Thanksgiving. 48
New Trade Routes
US Land Bridge
In 1972 the maritime industry led the development of the “land bridge” concept in the United
States. Goods were placed in sealed cargo containers, shipped across the Pacific Ocean to US west
coast ports, the container was off-loaded and placed on a train (or sometimes truck), travelled
across the US to an east coast port, and the container was placed on another cargo container ship
to sail to a European port, all without ever being emptied. Companies such as Seatrains Lines, Inc.
pioneered the use of multimodal trips across land rather than through an all-maritime route
through a canal or around the ends of a continent, saving time and money. Southern Pacific
Railroad developed the double-decked rail car to carry the containers. The land bridge cut three
or four days from the 21-day trip from Asian to US east coast ports. In the first five years of
operation, “the flow of internationalized freight across U.S. rails has risen 350%.” 49 By 2018, “at
least 42 percent of the carloads and intermodal units railroads carry, and more than 35 percent of
rail revenue, are directly associated with international trade.” 50
The multimodal approach to cargo movement has generated a new generation of large container
ships called New Panamax, which are able to travel through the enhanced locks of the Panama
Canal. A Panamax ship carried 5,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), while the New
Panamax ships carry 13,000 TEUs. By 2012 the Triple E ship of Maersk Lines was carrying 18,000
TEUs, and the planned MalaccaMax will carry 30,000 containers and barely clear the confines of
the Straits of Malacca’s shipping lane. The largest ship in service is the Maersk Gulsun, which
carries 23,756 TEUs, and its draft is 50 feet. 51 Its containers will fill three one-mile-long trains.
Demand for these ever-growing container ship designs is driven by “the volume of goods produced
in Asia and consumed in Europe and the US.” 52
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To serve these large ships and speed the movement of cargo, new high-speed cranes have been
developed with the capacity to lift two containers at once and to reach 22 containers across a vessel.
The container management system uses software that integrates the crane and the vehicle receiving
the shipment to enhance speed, with one port in Virginia reporting that 80% of its trucks picking
up containerized imports are loaded in less than one hour. Rail loading is similarly speeded up. 53
China’s One Belt, One Road
The “historic” routes of the twentieth century put US ports on both coasts at the center of world
trade. In February of 2020 The Economist noted that “China’s flagship foreign policy is a way to
put itself in the center again.” 54 The plan launched in 2013, 55 known as One Belt, One Road,
includes new rail lines, new and improved roads, and new ports around the world. 56 The name is
meant to evoke images of the famous Silk Road from China to Europe, the trade route that carried
Marco Polo. One focus of the policy is to develop a trans-continental set of connections between
China and its European customers with no water element in the supply chain. Called the New
European Land Bridge, it runs 7,500 miles from China to Duisberg 57 and Madrid, the longest rail
route “in the history of the world.” 58 In 2018 the rail links carried 4,000 trains per year westward
with 350,000 containers, 59 part of the New Silk Road economic belt. The Maritime Silk Road
runs to Africa and into the Mediterranean Sea. Forbes notes that the rail trip is expensive and takes
two weeks of rough riding for cargo to arrive in Europe. The trains currently carry only 100,000
TEUs per year, four days’ worth of Shanghai’s shipping capacity. So it is clear that this part of the
One Belt, One Road program is political, not economic. 60
China’s worldwide One Belt, One Road policy includes investments in many nations’
transportation infrastructure. A map in The Economist showed that most of the Eastern
Hemisphere’s nations have signed on for some aspect of the One Belt, One Road infrastructure
development program. 61 A number of European nations have given Chinese firms contracts “to
set up and operate in their national port, logistics and rail infrastructure…Under the BRI, Chinese
businesses, mostly state-owned, have built, acquired or been awarded maritime and rail
infrastructure concessions in the main commercial transit points.” 62 In 2019, 25 million cargo
containers traveled from Asia to Europe, the third-largest cargo route in the world.63 Concerns
have been raised about China’s port development investments in small Pacific island nations,
putting them into debt that they are unlikely to be able to repay. International financial experts are
concerned that, on default, China will take back control of the port, opening new opportunities
for Chinese naval bases across the Pacific. Chinese companies already control services in 61 ports
around the world. The 150-year-old Chinese Merchants Group runs 38 ports in 18 countries. It
is notable that China has invested $20 billion in foreign ports. 64 Notably, either COSCO, a major
Chinese shipping firm or the Chinese Merchants Group “manage port terminals around the
world’s five most important straits: Malacca, Hormuz, Gibraltar, Suez and Panama.” 65
While these investments and improvements make sense for a maritime trading power, the Chinese
ownership poses security challenges for US agencies monitoring supply chain security overseas.
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The ports are also a focus of military concern, as they offer options for projecting Chinese sea
power across the world. The Straits of Malacca, long patrolled by the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, are the
crossroads of the world’s oil route from the Middle Eastern oil producers to the Asian powerhouse
economies, including 80% of Chinese oil. Nearly one-third of all maritime trades pass through the
straits each year. 66 The need for enhanced supply chain security amidst the changing political
dynamics of trade is clear.
The Melting Arctic
Another factor in the development of new trade routes is the opening of the fabled Northwest
Passage from Europe to Asia. As climate change evolves, rising temperatures have opened the
Arctic Ocean to shipping, with the Maersk Venta container ship sailing from Vladivostok in far
eastern Russia on the Sea of Japan to Bremerhaven in Germany. The ship’s transit included
traveling through the Bering Strait between Russia and Alaska into the Arctic Ocean, marking a
new route for container ship travel. The 23-day voyage westward across Russia’s northern shore
took place from August to September 2018, as the sea lanes in the Arctic Ocean are currently only
clear from July through October. 67 Another landmark journey was made in the summer of 2016
by the luxury cruise ship Crystal Serenity, which sailed for 32 days from Seward, Alaska, eastward
to New York City through the Arctic Ocean along the Alaskan and Canadian shores. 68 The
opening of Arctic Sea routes will create both new competition for control of the northern
waterways and also lead to overlapping national claims of sovereignty in the 200-mile exclusive
economic zone under the United Nations’ Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, 69 which came into
force in 1994. Conservationists worry that the presence of floating sea ice and rough seas may lead
to maritime accidents and ecological disasters. 70
The Bering Strait is only 55 miles wide at its narrowest point, with depths ranging from 98 to 164
feet. The waterway also has a number of islands that complicate navigation. At the Diomedes
Islands, the US and Russia are only five miles apart. 71 A PanaMax container ship has a draft of
about 40 feet, while a New PanaMax has a draft of about 50 feet, leaving little room for error in
navigating around islands. With the Russian interest in opening their northern shore for
commercial development, the strait could become congested with commercial shipping. Managing
the strait could become a challenge for the US Coast Guard and create STSCS challenges. Russia
is developing its north shore for extraction activities, with plans to create logistics support at the
Murmansk end of the Northern Sea Route, connecting its Far East to its western outlet into the
Atlantic Ocean. In 2020, plans were developed for the creation of a new logistics support
community at the Atlantic Ocean end, separate from the Murmansk Naval Base area.72
Sustainability
A critical element of all supply chains is the need for sustainability. In 2016 the UN noted that
“supply chain sustainability can no longer be ignored.” 73 Customers must be able to rely on the
delivery of parts and products to maintain their businesses and perhaps even their own link in the
supply chain. FEMA provides guidance on developing supply chain sustainability, focusing on the
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role of supply chains as lifelines for communities. Transportation is acknowledged as “enabling the
movement of goods and services” and supporting all other community lifelines. 74
In the FEMA context, STSCS is threatened by natural hazards that damage or destroy the
infrastructure on which the supply chain transportation depends, as noted in Kobe, Japan, after
the 1995 earthquake. 75 Earthquakes, hurricanes and tsunamis all offer examples of significant
disruption of transportation systems. From a security perspective, tampering, criminal enterprise,
and terrorist activity during natural hazards events challenge security plan implementation. From
the UN perspective, the partners in the supply chain should develop a resilience plan to ensure that
their ability to produce the product continues, regardless of externalities. An element of resilience
plans is: “understands and adapts to external factors that may impact a company’s ability to produce
a product or deliver a service.” 76 So from a security perspective, this requires systems that can
withstand natural, technological and human-caused disasters and still keep the cargo, container,
vessel, port, road, rail and depot functional when the event has abated.
Today sustainability is also related to climate change, meaning the minimizing of environmental
impacts from the operations. In 2016 the United Nations (UN) held a webinar called The State of
Sustainable Supply Chains: Building Responsible and Resilient Supply Chains and issued a follow-on
report. 77 Of the UN’s 17 sustainable development goals, three relate to supply chains: sustainable
cities and communities, responsible consumption and production, and climate action. The UN
lists the elements that should be part of a sustainable supply chain as human rights, labor,
environment, and anti-corruption. STSCS relates directly to anti-corruption, in working to
prevent criminal enterprise, piracy, terrorist attack, adulteration of products, counterfeiting of
goods, and bribery.
However, environmental consciousness can also inform the management of the supply chain, such
as incorporating synchromodal strategies that focus on the lowest cost, shortest time and least CO2
emissions along the supply chain. While this can be viewed as a good business practice, such
integrated supply chain management limits the amount of time that goods are in transit, thereby
lessening exposure to all forms of interference with the successful delivery of the items. For
example, the new super cranes include cyber elements that incorporate scheduling the pickup of
containers in a port to speed the truck turn-around times to less than an hour. 78 With the goods
loaded and sealed at the factory, and containers loaded onto delivery trucks directly from the
container ship, there is little opportunity for tampering with the cargo. This means that security
can be focused on the “last mile” delivery to a warehouse, or to the railhead, instead of consuming
extensive resources at the docks.
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity has a prominent role in the management of business and government activities.
While it has achieved increased academic recognition, with degrees in cybersecurity being offered
at major national universities,79 not all agencies have developed complete cybersecurity systems.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has created the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
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Security Agency (CISA), a national risk management center for US critical infrastructure. The
cybersecurity branch notes that “[c]yberspace and its underlying infrastructure are vulnerable to a
wide range of risks stemming from both physical and cyber threats and hazards.” 80 Palo Alto
Networks has noted that the supply chain is the weakest link in cybersecurity. The cybersecurity
of each partner in the chain is controlled within its own organization so that one partner with weak
protections exposes the rest of the partners to hackers. New vulnerabilities are developing through
the “Internet of Things, digital buyer-seller relationships, and robotic process automation,” raising
the need to know how you’re your “suppliers, and their suppliers’ suppliers, and so on down the
value chain, have the same kind of protection.” 81
Within the surface transportation element of the global supply chain, there are multiple points of
cyber vulnerability. SCADA systems have long been used to manage industrial systems and power
grids and now operate the engines of merchant marine vessels. Navigation is carried out through
cyber bases systems using global positioning systems (GPS). Cyber control of road and railroad
signals, train and ship scheduling, and bridge operations offers further opportunities for hackers to
interfere.82 Damaging the navigation cyber connection can cause a ship to go off course or even
get lost at sea. Disruption in train signals can cause derailments, which can lead to environmental
damage, fires and impacts on communities along the tracks.
Recent incidents have demonstrated the cybersecurity threat to maritime transportation. In July
2019, the US Coast Guard assisted a vessel bound for New York that had been subjected to a
malware attack. The ship’s owners failed to provide adequate cyber protection for the on-board
computer that was used for electronic charts, cargo management, and communication with the
port, pilots and Coast Guard. They determined that the vessel’s lack of appropriate cyber
protection was “exposing critical vessel control systems to significant vulnerabilities.”83 A more
serious attack occurred in December of 2019 when a ransomware attack dubbed Ryuk shut down
a port facility for 30 hours. “The virus further burrowed into the industrial control systems that
monitor and control cargo transfer and encrypted files critical to process operations. The impacts
to the facility included a disruption of the entire corporate IT network (beyond the footprint of
the facility), disruption of camera and physical access control systems, and loss of critical process
control monitoring systems.” 84 A Singapore-based cybersecurity firm warned that ransomware
attacks against ports could cost the world economy $110 billion. 85
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation have developed
tools to educate the transportation sector about cyber risks, and provides tools to guide the
development of cybersecurity programs. Trucking, maritime and freight rail elements are all
discussed in the Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan, 86 but the integration from vendor
through the supply chain is not addressed. Cross-sector dependencies with power and public safety
are acknowledged, and the importance of partners and stakeholders is discussed, but there is no
discussion of the weak link outside the transportation sector that may expose the supply chain to
cyber attack.
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In February of 2020, the National Institutes for Standards and Testing (NIST) issued a draft of
Key Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (Draft NISTIR 8276) which “provides a set
of strategies to help businesses address the cybersecurity threats posed by modern information and
communications technology products.”87 It aims to address the vulnerabilities in the supply chain
using lessons from 24 case studies that show “how components and services from third party
entities” 88 make securing the supply chain difficult. When the final report is issued, it will provide
a valuable tool for securing the surface transportation supply chain’s cyber elements.
The US government is aware that transportation security requires attention to numerous other
threats besides those posed by technological developments and has developed an overall strategy
to combat them. The US Transportation Security Administration’s TSA Strategy 2018-2026 lists
its primary goal to “improve security and safeguard the transportation system” and highlights the
need to “promote security partnerships across surface transportation systems.” 89 The strategy noted
six key trends that must be addressed to enhance STSCS over the next eight years: continuous
threat, emerging technologies, cyber-physical interdependency, passenger experience, changing
workforce and transportation system and the economy. In its report to Congress with a shorterterm view, 2018 Biennial National Strategy for Transportation Security, 90 the TSA offers some areas
for exploration within its modal security and intermodal security plans which are focused on
protecting transportation assets “from attack or disruption by terrorist or other hostile forces….”91
The strategy lays out the primary types of threats to STSCS, and lists the challenges, addressed at
the macro level that requires research. It notes, “each area requires thoughtful collaboration to
achieve a common understanding of challenges, impacts, and feasible solutions.” This research,
through the development of the bibliographies and the use of a Delphi workshop, addresses these
aspirations.

2.6 COVID-19
In January 2020, a novel coronavirus began to spread from Wuhan, China. The virus, called
COVID-19, caused acute respiratory illness for many people who contracted the disease, with a
2.5% fatality rate worldwide by June of 2020, when 7 million people were known to have the
disease, and 404,142 had died. 92 Since many people have had the disease but remained
asymptomatic,93 a true count of the number of affected people will be hard to develop. To protect
communities from the virulent person-to-person spread, public health leaders in the United States
and Europe called for “shelter-in-place” orders from mid-March through June. Social impacts
included the closure of schools and workplaces, people working from home, students attending
classes through computer-based systems, and a rise in unemployment, as all but “essential”
businesses were closed. In the United States, the federal government provided $1,200 per adult
and $500 per child in direct financial support to everyone earning less than $90,000 per year, and
offered unemployment insurance payments plus $600 per week to enable people to buy food and
necessities, and keep the economy going. The G20 nations provided stimulus packages to their
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citizens, with the US programs worth about 11% of GDP, Japan at 21%, and most European
nations providing about 5%. 94 By May 2020, the US had an unemployment rate of 13.3%. 95
The economic impacts of COVID-19 have been mixed and have changed over time. While travel
restrictions imposed by nations have severely impacted the travel and tourism sector, the online
retail segment has actually added jobs as people experiencing shelter-in-place switched purchasing
options to e-commerce.96 Medical research has seen funding infusions as researchers work on
developing a vaccine against the disease. Ford Motor Company is making ventilators, while
Bacardi and other breweries are making hand sanitizer. Forbes Magazine listed dozens of US
companies that switched to making products or providing services to support the response to
COVID-19. 97 Unlike recessions driven by bad financial management decisions, this recession was
driven by government action, causing widespread shutdowns of the economy; it will have a clear
end date, driven by the lifting of shelter-in-place orders and the gradual reopening of businesses. 98
COVID-19 hit China first, causing wholesale closure of factories, thereby slowing the worldwide
supply of trade goods. In January and February 2020, China’s exports drop by over 17%, and
imports also fell 4%. Exports to the US fell 27.7% in January and February, with an increase of
2.5% of imports from the US, 99 driven largely by the import of meat. 100 (The two months are
reported together because the Chinese lunar new year shut down for two weeks occurs at different
times each year.) While factories reopened in March for many consumer goods, the
reestablishment of supply chains delayed some manufacturing.101 Chinese exports flowing into the
United States were slowed by the COVID-19 shutdowns, impacting ports in Los Angeles,
Oakland and Seattle. One million jobs in metropolitan Los Angeles are tied directly to the Ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach, where 90% of the Long Beach containers come from Asia. Jobs
for longshoremen, truckers, warehouse workers and rail systems were impacted by the factory
shutdowns in Asia and the slow reopening. 102
COVID-19 also demonstrated the insecurity of international medical supply chains. The world
had long relied on China for personal protective equipment for medical workers, such as masks
and gloves, ventilators and hand sanitizer. The closure of Chinese factories limited the supply of
these essential goods, as the available supplies we re-routed to areas within China fighting the
coronavirus. Forty-three percent (43%) of the world’s medical supplies were made in China,103
creating a single point of failure when the COVID-19 closed China’s factories and led to the
creation of more stringent export regulations that further slowed shipments. By March of 2020,
medical exports to the US from China were down 24%. 104

2.7 Policy and Security
Think tanks have undertaken studies on supply chain risk management. The Potomac Institute
for Policy Studies hosted the Vital Infrastructure Workshop and created a report, “Security
Strategies for Global Supply Chains.” 105 However, the work lacks a focus on transportation systems
and their effect on the supply chain: differing routes, technologies and carriers, moving goods from
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one mode to another. The report summarizes presentations on multiple sectors that would inform
the development of a comprehensive blueprint for applied research on supply chain risk and
transportation across all modes.
Implementation of new policies in STSCS will require the cooperation of supply chain operators,
who must be conscious of stakeholder demands, the technology used by competitors, and
stockholders’ interest in the “bottom line,” which they protect with insurance policies instead of
making changes in operations. New technologies are adopted for efficiency, link cyber-based
navigation systems on merchant ships, but the investment in security is lacking, leading to malware
and ransomware attacks. The current literature has a reactive orientation, addressing problems that
have already been demonstrated, while what is needed is forward-thinking about problems that
might arise and solutions to prevent them. New regulations and policies should follow the NIST
lead in promoting resilience, inter-agency cooperation and integration. CISA’s 2018
Transportation Systems Sector Activities Progress Report found that “the security programs had
earned an overall score of 3.6 out of 5, the lowest (3.2) was awarded to “enhancing the all-hazards
preparedness and resilience of the global transportation system to safeguard US national
interests.” 106
To develop proactive policies, more research is needed in specific fields. Government policies
related to STSCS need to focus more on interactions among the facets of the supply chain and the
vulnerabilities that are created. Implementation of these policies should be encouraged through
incentives based on the effectiveness of the strategies that have been adopted. Different types of
supply chains should have different levels of expectation for security adoption. Pharmaceutical
supply chains should have Food and Drug Administration rules that ensure the safety and quality
of the products not only at the point of production but through the whole supply chain. Speed of
delivery impacts shelf life, for example. 107 Implementation of blockchain technology might limit
tampering and adulteration of products in shipment, but better security for the container through
the supply chain might equally rely on RFI tags and high-speed cranes. Government and the
private sector both place a high priority on the success of the supply chain, which can be best
secured through security plans that are coordinated across all elements of the supply chain. Carl
Schroeder said that foresight is about minimizing surprise. STSCS research should aim to create
maximum foresight as the transportation elements of the supply chain become more dependent on
cyber elements, involve more emerging economies and have to navigate through the challenges of
international diplomacy.
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III. Methodology
The methodology for this research relies on a mixed methods approach. It began with a
comprehensive search for bibliographic material in peer reviewed journals and academic materials.
While there is a great deal of literature on the general topic of supply chain security, there is little
available on the integrated approach to surface transportation supply chain security as a multimodal enterprise. The available academic literature was gathered into an Excel-based bibliography
that collected the material in numerous searchable frameworks, such as vulnerability, types of risks,
modes of transportation, technology’s role, and supply chain type and issues. This searchable
bibliography is attached to the publication’s webpage for easy access, along with a sheet of
instructions for using it.
Another area of concern is the adversary aspect of supply chain security. It is critical to understand
who is trying to damage supply chain security and what the motives are. A search of adversary
literature was conducted, resulting in a companion bibliography in searchable Excel format that is
also attached on the webpage. Together, these two bibliographies provide new resources to support
deeper research into the security of the integrated surface transportation supply chain.
Delphi Method Workshop
A new approach is needed that looks at the issue of supply chain security and surface
transportation’s role from multiple perspectives and considers their implications for America’s
economic future. From the geographical perspective, how do changing transportation routes and
the relationship to climate change impact supply chain security, such as the melting of the Arctic
ice cap and the development of Russian cargo terminals on the north shore? How do developing
technology and cybersecurity issues impact supply chain security and transportation, such as the
US Navy being hacked through its ties to university networks. 108 What is the impact of
autonomous vehicles, including ships, automated fleet management, and larger containers and
longer ships, on surface transportation? How is the US economy impacted by these changes to
surface transportation supply chain security?
An expert workshop was convened using the Delphi method in San José, California, on January
9–10, 2020, to examine the future trajectory of surface transportation supply chain security issues
and consider where the knowledge gaps are currently. Local, state and federal government agencies
were represented, along with perspectives of international organizations and the private sector.
Each representative gave a presentation to provide a framework for understanding his or her aspect
of the surface transportation supply chain security challenges. The group then evaluated the
existing knowledge, the gaps in that knowledge, and created a blueprint for future essential
research into enhancing surface transportation supply chain security from unfolding and future
perils.
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The research areas considered for the blueprint included the following:
•

Types of modal relations and their interactions that characterize the transportation
systems of US supply chains.

•

Types of assets that are secured (cargo, ships, ports and other facilities, routes,
intellectual property) and identify the value of each.

•

Risk factors that may potentially impact these systems such as terrorism (destruction
and havoc creation), criminal activities (theft and substitution), climate, technology
(cyber and power) and projection of national power.

Using the Delphi method, the workshop discussions focused on areas needing the greatest research
emphasis in the near term, based on the analysis by the experts. They considered the potential
impact of each upon contemporary supply chain security issues, including geography (i.e., China's
belt and road; Russia's Arctic trade strategy; US land bridge). They considered the impact of the
risk factors, singly or in combination, upon the assets, and their relationships (intermodal,
multimodal, synchromodal) along dimensions such as the denial of service, disruption, and damage
to the system, and assessed the potential costs (monetary, reputation, public confidence). They
identified the key actors (private sector, local, state, national and international government
agencies, and international organizations) concerned with transportation and the related issues,
evaluated the effectiveness of the policies that have been implemented, and obstacles to enhancing
security and resilience, such as cyber systems, governmental silos, and emphasis on profitability.
The research blueprint is the outcome of the two days of presentations and discussions. Among
primary concerns were providing some guidance on developing policy at the local, state, regional,
national and international levels, taking into account constraints and externalities.
The discussion included practical questions about the current surface transportation supply chain
security system. What is the system trying to protect? Is it the cargo or the vehicle or the system
or the route? Legal/ethical/moral conflicts arise regarding where to place the emphasis. Other
elements of the legal environment will impact how the nexus between supply chain security and
transportation is understood. Different elements of risk have their own mandates and agendas. Is
the emphasis cybersecurity or physical security domains, and which comes first? Is the bigger
concern terrorism or criminal enterprise? The mafia was always concerned with providing security
to their clientele. Is bribery acceptable? A thorough understanding of supply chain security requires
understanding the various nuances across professional boundaries. The workshop offered the
opportunity for discussion of these challenges among experts.
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IV. Bibliography Development and Literature Review
Although there is widespread acknowledgement that these new challenges are creating a need for
new policy responses to deal with these developments that are already creating a new international
environment for global business and placing strains and uncertainties on existing US supply chain
structures and patterns, the extent to which these—and other themes—have received adequate
scholarly attention clearly deserves careful consideration.
Accordingly, the goals of this project may be summarized as follows:
•

To develop a bibliography of currently available research in the field that will support
future practical research on enhanced supply chain security.

•

To develop a blueprint for future research and development for transportation’s role in
supply chain security from technological and human-caused hazards.

•

To create a blueprint for research that will enhance the security of global supply chains
by enhancing risk management in its transportation systems.

•

To identify practical measures that can be adopted by operators and government
agencies in order to enhance the security and resilience of supply chain transportation
systems.

From a geographical perspective, for example, how do changing transportation routes and the
relationship to climate change impact supply chain security, such as the melting of the Arctic ice
cap and the development of Chinese cargo terminals across the globe? From an ethical perspective,
what is the relationship between data security and privacy? What challenges do emerging
technological and cybersecurity issues pose for supply chain risk management and transportation?
What is the impact of autonomous vehicles, including ships, automated fleet management, and
longer containers and longer ships, on surface transportation? How is the US economy impacted
by these changes to supply chain security? And, how effectively are these new security challenges
being met?
When considering the degree to which public and private policymakers are dealing effectively with
these challenges, numerous other questions deserve careful consideration. As noted above, the
focus of security will differ across modes. Agencies have their own unique views of security, such
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s focus on making a criminal case that stands up in court
versus the Drug Enforcement Administration’s focus on interdiction and disruption of illicit
supply chains. The mafia was always concerned with providing security to their clientele.
Given such a range of issues and questions, the ones that are essential to understanding the topic
are as follows:
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1. What is the background and current state of the research in supply chain risk
management’s transportation dimension?
2. What work has been completed by existing transportation and supply chain scholars and
organizations, and published in either peer reviewed or professional journals?
3. What are the future research needs, and what is the path forward for the development
of practical policies, programs and technologies to enhance supply chain risk
management’s transportation dimension?
In order to answer such questions, it was essential to maintain a strict focus given the variety of
challenges, their increasingly recognized implications for America’s strategic future, and the
multiple perspectives that can be used to examine issues related to supply chain risk management
and transportation’s role therein. Accordingly, the following tasks were undertaken. The research
began with the creation of a bibliography containing academic and other relevant publications that
could be analyzed in order to identify the attention paid to critical issues. The results of this analysis
led to the expansion of the research in order to deal with certain issues in more depth and,
especially, to assess the state of policy development. Completing these two areas led to the
identification of the most important lines of research that can inform the development of future
work in the area and contribute to the enhancement of the security of supply chain transportation
systems. The attached bibliography is structured so as to reflect these two phases. The first part
includes the works that were quantitatively analyzed, the second the other works that were
consulted.
Through this work, the research examined the ways in which the literature:
1. Defined the scope and content of such key concepts as risk, security, safety, terrorism,
resilience, and emergency management so as to establish a precise focus for the study.
2. Defined the types of modal relations and their interactions that characterize the
transportation systems of US supply chains.
3. Defined the assets that are secured (cargo, ships, ports and other facilities, routes,
intellectual property) and identified the value of each
4. Identified the risk factors that may potentially impact these systems, such as terrorism
(destruction and havoc creation), criminal activities (theft and substitution), climate, and
technology, recognizing that geo-political factors exist that are outside of the scope of
this research.
5. Classified the potential impact of each risk factor upon contemporary supply chain
security, including geography (i.e., China’s belt and road; Russia’s Arctic trade strategy;
China’s African food strategy; US land bridge).
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6. Identified the impact of the risk factors stated above, singly or in combination, upon the
assets and their relationships (modal, multi-modal, intermodal) along dimensions such
as a denial of service, disruption, damage to the system and assessment of the potential
costs (including monetary, reputation, and public confidence).
7. Identified the key actors (private sector, local and national government agencies,
international organizations) concerned with transportation and the related issues, then
evaluated the effectiveness of the policies that have been implemented and obstacles to
enhancing security and resilience such as an “online society,” governmental silos, and
emphasis on profitability.
8. Provided some guidance on developing policy at the local, state, regional, national and
international levels, taking into account constraints and externalities.
In addition to determining the extent to which the existing literature answers such questions,
however, it is important to consider how these can be translated into policies. To that end, a
workshop was convened to bring together academics, security officials and supply chain
professionals to consider the issue of supply chain risk management and transportation’s role from
the multiple perspectives cited above, including their implications for America’s economic future.

4.1 Supply Chain Risk Management
These surface transportation supply chain security developments have attracted the attention of an
increasing number of academics, as well as public and private sector organizations involved with
ensuring the efficiency and security of supply chains generally and transportation systems
specifically. A large literature has emerged dealing with these topics, although these topics have
not received the attention in the enormous supply chain literature that might have been expected.
As mentioned previously, over 40,000 books and articles dealing with various aspects of supply
chain management were published between 1982 and 2015. Only one of the popular textbooks
dealt with transportation and concluded by identifying such topics as security, sustainability, risk,
and disruption are “promising future research areas.” 109
Yet a rich body of work, the Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) literature, has developed
in recent years as a result of the ever-increasing concern with the risks that supply chain managers
confront. This body of works also covers a wide range of topics and perspectives. Scholars have
attempted to create models that consider such variables as probability, impact, interactions,
frequency, duration and type, and to develop techniques to minimize the impacts and
consequences of these different situations. 110 How rapidly this field has grown is evidenced by the
great increase in published research—from 8 articles in 2003 to 33 in 2013, for a total of 224. 111
This study too reveals the limited attention paid to transportation—only one article out of 143
that were analyzed dealt with this risk area.112
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Even in its areas of focus, however, this literature suffers from a number of shortcomings. The first
is the conceptual issue that there are “many discussions about risk but few clear and concise
definitions.”113 This issue is, of course, not limited to this literature but encompasses all the other
terms relevant to any consideration of transportation security issues such as “terrorism,” “security,”
“resilience,” “safety,” “inter-modalism” and the like. 114
Another important area that has been largely neglected in the SCRM literature is the role of macro
challenges, although the “risks” are commonly divided between the “micro” and the “macro,” with
the former receiving an overwhelming degree of attention. One study found that almost half (70)
of the 143 articles that were analyzed focused on supply risks, another 27% dealt with demand
issues. Only six articles dealt with macro challenges, even though an understanding of such issues
would seem of great importance if supply chain managers and decision makers are to successfully
manage a supply chain or develop policies that enhance the security of all its elements, including
transportation. 115
The studies that have attempted to deal with these issues often use the Delphi method to identify
and aggregate expert opinion. One that focused on the “new field” of “Security Supply Chain
Management” sought to determine how a variety of stakeholders viewed various elements in the
macro and the micro-environments and assessed their impact on the logistics industry by 2025. 116
Its respondents held the highest anticipations regarding the following areas: economically, the
energy supply; politically, the advancement of least developed countries (LDCs) and a global water
crisis; socio-culturally, the continuing importance of human capital and the ability to respond
rapidly to natural disasters; and technologically, major advances in transport systems.117
A limited body of literature focuses explicitly on the future of logistics. A German study has
analyzed this topic in-depth, using the Delphi approach that included detailed interviews with the
top 50 logistics providers and other major practitioners. It found that the major themes that would
characterize the industry in 2025 were: (1) a concern with social responsibility, (2) increased global
business interactions through political and legal issues, (3) a shortage of qualified personnel, (4)
changing customer expectations, and (5) digitization. These results demonstrate the limited
attention that supply chain officials paid to security issues as late as 2013. 118
Clearly, the academic literature dealing with the potential impact of global developments upon the
supply chains’ security issues generally, and their transportation systems specifically, is quite
limited. As one recent study of these topics noted, “there is clearly a research gap in the domain of
infrastructural risks such as transportation, information and financial risks as well as macro
risks.” 119
This finding is largely consonant with the substantial literature that has been produced by supply
chain organizations. As might be expected, given the changes that have been taking place globally,
it seeks to help ensure that global supply chains continue to function effectively in an environment
that poses new and complex challenges. Thus, its primary focus is upon how the risks that
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managers and operators of supply chains confront—such as enhanced technological competition,
sub-contractor failure, inadequate information and the like—can best be assessed and mitigated so
as to achieve enhanced efficiency and thus, profitability. Macro factors and transportation security
receive only limited attention.
Business for Social Responsibility (BSR), for example, has identified the following as the major
change agents through 2025—the adoption of new technologies, climate change and resource
scarcity, human migration, changing markets, and “mixed signals on trade and transparency.” It
then makes recommendations on how firms should prepare themselves to function effectively in
this new environment, especially in terms of its procurement policies. 120
Similarly, the Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, which recognizes “that businesses
are trading in unprecedented economic and political times,” emphasizes economic and financial
factors. Its recent report, published in December 2017, concluded that its risk index (which stood
at 79.8) though high, because of political and economic tensions, had improved because of
increased global growth and reduced risks in the major economies.
Business organizations, however, are not the only ones concerned with the future of supply chains.
Many “think tanks” have also expressed their concern, and these do tend to focus on geo-political
factors and their national security implications. Thus, when the Council on Foreign Relations held
a workshop in May 2016 to discuss the future of global supply chains, its participants shared BSR’s
concern with growing protectionism and climate change, but it also noted the prevalence of
cyberattacks and human rights abuses, as well as the rise of China and the implications of these
developments for national security. 121
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, studies dealing with transportation security issues
have also proliferated greatly. The Transportation Research Board published an early relevant
work, “Deterrence, protection, and preparation: the new transportation security imperative” in
2002, and some scattered studies can be traced back to the mid-2000s with discussions of terrorist
and criminal activities aggravating the dangers inherent in hazardous shipments. 122

4.2 The Literature: Issues and Coverage
What is not clear, however, is how the transportation security literature is dealing with the macro
risk factors in terms not only of identification but also as regards the development and
implementation of effective policies to mitigate these risks. Accordingly, the research identified
and analyzed 113 articles dealing with transportation security issues, 81 of which (72%) were
academic, many of which were themselves reviews of bodies of literature, eight (7%) were by private
sector organizations and companies, ten (9%) by US governmental agencies, and 14 (12%) by
independent and international agencies.
Surface supply chain transportation systems encompass a variety of modes that operate on sea and
land. Yet, surprisingly, very limited attention has been paid to the security of the land
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transportation systems’ components—rail, road, and pipelines. Of the works that were analyzed,
35 (31%) dealt with the maritime sector, whereas only ten (8%) focused on land transportation. By
far the largest number, however, 60 (53%) involved transportation generally.
Figure 1.

Bibliographic Analysis: Mode

The emphasis on maritime was repeated when the research considered the specific vehicles that
were discussed: 31 works (27%) involved ships compared to only nine (8%) with land vehicles,
three (2%) with trains, and six (4%) with trucks). The majority 55 (49%) dealt with all modes,
while the remainder focused on general administrative and policy issues.
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Figure 2.

Bibliographic Analysis: Vessels

Though it can be argued that the focus on the security of maritime supply chains is justified, given
that the vast majority of international trade is sea-based, and that most of the literature examines
global supply chains, not specific products or regions, such a proposition ignores the critical role
played by the risks to the cargoes after they have been offloaded and shipped by truck and/or rail
to warehouses and customers.
Clearly, the land modes require greater attention. Though very limited literature deals with truck
freight issues, that mode certainly deserves greater notice. Rail freight transportation, which has
been neglected even more, and which is known to present security issues, remains a topic that is
certainly worthy of more research. Equally striking is the total absence of another mode of land
transportation, pipelines.
Pipelines play a critical role in the economy, and ensuring their security is clearly a matter of
national importance, one that has been officially recognized by the US government.
Administratively, they have been officially defined as a transportation mode by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), 123 and numerous efforts have been made to ensure its security, given
its vulnerabilities to physical attacks and cyber threats.124 Clearly this is yet another sector that
deserves more academic consideration.
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Furthermore, the relationship between inter-modalism and security also seems to have been totally
ignored. The need to coordinate freight movements as they travel through various modes became
evermore obvious, and technological developments made it increasingly possible to create an
integrated system. By the end of the 20th century, the need to move policies away from individual
modes was widely recognized, and in 1991 the US Congress enacted the landmark Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). Concomitantly, the number of studies dealing
with inter-modalism has increased greatly. However, scholars have focused on such topics as
conceptualization, quality and efficiency, and modelling. 125 Thus, it is not surprising that another
recent study of how risk issues were handled in intermodal supply chains found “very few papers
on the topic of intermodal supply chain risks.” 126 None of the works in the current literature review
dealt explicitly with this important topic. This is clearly another important area that deserves
greater attention.
Not surprisingly, the bibliography of literature that was analyzed revealed a great concern with
risk; 43% of the sources ranked it a high concern, 8% considered it a moderate issue, 18% classified
it a matter of low concern, and 38% regarded it as a matter that varied over time. When viewed in
terms of the major issues confronting supply chains and their transportation systems, similar results
prevailed. Security ranked as the major topic (48), and when combined with risk assessment (27),
accounted for 65% of the total. Surprisingly, management issues accounted for 35% of the total.
When the data is analyzed over time, there is a marked degree of fluctuation over the last 17 years,
but certain trends emerge clearly. First, while risk assessment has consistently been a common
topic of discussion for some time, supply chain security specifically has been discussed with
increasing frequency in the past decade. And, as might be expected, while attention paid to internal
issues has remained fairly constant, albeit at a higher level in the years following 2010, interest in
external threats and vulnerabilities has increased markedly in recent years. Surprisingly, however,
the rise did not begin until 2012 and accelerated markedly only after 2017.
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Figure 3.

Figure 4.

Mentions of Vulnerability Type by Year

External Mentions of Vulnerability Type by Year

The literature also recognizes that supply chain transportation systems are potentially subject to
many sources of risk, and it is clear that it has focused on these to varying degrees. The most cited
source was the threat of a terrorist attack (23%), followed by organizational sources (14%) and
natural disasters (13%), geo-political factors (9%) and crime and piracy (12%). That criminal
activity received so little attention is rather surprising, given its widespread prevalence.
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Figure 5.

Sources of Risk to Supply Chain Transportation Systems

The changing geo-political global landscape, as noted above, was mentioned in only 9% of the
literature that was analyzed, as compared to 13% that were concerned with the impact of natural
disasters.
Yet the roles that such factors are playing and will play in the coming decades suggests that they
deserve far more attention. They have already aroused increasing concern in government circles.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), for example, has issued a report dealing with
such issues. The TSA Strategy 2018-2026 identifies the six key trends that it believes will impact
its activities in the years to come. These are: (1) Continuous Threat, (2) Emerging Technologies,
(3) Cyber Physical Interdependency, (4) Passenger Experience, (5) Changing Workforce, and (6)
Transportation System and the Economy. It is in the process of developing specific goals, priorities
and plans in these areas. 127
Although this document reflects an awareness of the importance of a long-term perspective, it
must be noted that half of these trends relate specifically to the internal workings of an
organization. Only three identify external forces that will have a major impact on the functioning
of transportation systems: (1) terrorism, (3) cyber threats, and (6) changing geo-economic patterns.
However, not only do these dimensions deserve elaboration, but it is also necessary to consider
other macro factors whose impacts upon the security of the transport systems that integrate the
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global network of supply chains are already discernible. Specifically, geo-political issues such as
growing trade tensions received little attention, as did the geo-economic changes that are already
impacting the global trading system. Yet such factors as the emergence of new economic powers
will clearly impact existing supply chain transportation systems directly by creating new logistics
networks that will render established ones obsolete.
China’s “new silk road,” which consists of both land and sea projects, is by far the largest and most
grandiose program of this sort. Designed to establish new trade corridors that will link China to
Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe, it is costing over $900 billion and involves over 60
countries. China has also invested heavily in ports and other transport facilities in Africa, where
many states are exploring ways to expand and integrate their railroad systems. Whether it will
succeed in achieving its ambitious goals, however, is a subject of much debate. 128
There is, however, little doubt that all these developments represent a major challenge to existing
trade patterns that have been traditionally centered around the US, the EU and Japan. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Economic Department has
carried out a detailed study that concluded that Asia will continue to expand its role in the
manufacturing sectors for decades, so that “the share of global trade within the present OECD
will decline from 50% in 2012 to 25% by 2060, while trade among non-OECD economies will
account for approximately one-third of global trade.” 129 Moreover, these developments will shape
the shipping sector, including the size and type of ships and their technologies. 130 Its strategic and
security implications have also received attention. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation of the US Congress, for example, recently held a hearing on “China’s
Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Implications for the Global Maritime Supply Chain.” 131
Trade routes are also being shaped by environmental factors. Climate change is already affecting
the production of various agricultural products throughout the world and making possible the
development of new routes such as the Northwest Passage. This will have serious implications for
existing routes and facilities, since it will cut the distance from Asia to Europe and the US by 30%
and 20%, respectively, and thus negatively impact Panama and Egypt since the number of ships
using the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal will greatly decrease. On the other hand, the Baltic
and the North Sea countries, especially Russia, will benefit greatly. President Putin officially
announced in 2018 that Russia was adopting a maritime policy to increase its traffic through the
Arctic. As part of that effort, Russia is actively pursuing various projects to enable it to optimize
its ability to use the new routes, including building a new port on its Arctic shore. 132
Nor can one ignore the environmental impacts of maritime transportation. Numerous efforts are
already underway to deal with this problem. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), for
example, has adopted a program designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ships by at
least 50% from the 2008 base by 2050. Many believe, however, that additional policies and
regulations are required. As a United Nations (UN) representative recently stated: “we are headed
for an environmental disaster” unless the maritime industry drastically cuts its emissions.133 Such
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measures will obviously change maritime technology and create new possibilities for attacks and
exploitation.
These issues are also linked to the growing concern with sustainable development. Sustainability
incorporates many other dimensions besides pollution, such as human rights, gender equity and
fair trade. All these topics have obvious implications for patterns of national and international
growth, as well as for the operations of supply chains in various sectors. Each dimension has
received increasing attention by corporations that have reacted to governmental concerns and the
efforts by private organizations to bring about change in corporate policies. As a result, public
concern has risen to such a degree that in a 2016 report, Ernst and Young, a major accounting and
professional services firm, noted that “supply chain sustainability can no longer be ignored.” 134
Such issues can be traced back to the container revolution that began a few decades ago and rapidly
transformed transportation, thus contributing greatly to the emergence of today’s system of
globalized supply chains. Now, new technologies are again disrupting existing patterns and are
likely to so ever more intensely in coming decades. Numerous organizations are exploring and
developing a variety of technologies ranging from blockchain to 3D printing to drones to the
Internet of Things (IOT) platforms. According to one expert, the key trends in 2017 involved
autonomous road transport, crowdsourcing freight, apps that permitted a shipper to obtain instant
freight services and digital freight matching.135 Indeed, there is widespread agreement on such
developments. Another professional agreed that autonomous trucking will be commonplace, that
trucking will be “Uberized,” that blockchains will create immense visibility along the supply chain,
that such changes are already underway, as evidenced by reports that Rolls Royce plans to launch
autonomous cargo ships by 2030, and that Amazon will use drones for last- mile deliveries.136
Numerous other examples of companies moving rapidly ahead can be cited, including the
development of a blockchain application for tracking cargo operations by Maersk and IBM that is
being tested by a number of ports and Dutch and US customs. 137
Technology, however, is a mixed blessing, for each innovation can be and has been used for
nefarious purposes, which range from theft to product substitution and from falsification to ransom
demands. Ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere enhance the threat from terrorism
and pose obvious security challenges, as does piracy. Though pirate attacks have decreased since
2019, the problem remains acute, especially around West Africa.
As might be expected, the literature that was analyzed for the bibliography reflected these
concerns. Terrorism was considered the major threat (23%), criminal activities (including piracy),
rather surprisingly, were cited only 7% of the time. As was mentioned above, this is a surprisingly
low figure given the degree of criminal activity and the recognized need by the US government to
deal with this problem. 138 Furthermore, while discussions of terrorism in relation to supply chain
security seriously increased in the 2000s; after 2010, it has largely plateaued. Though it continues
to be a common theme, it has not increased in importance much since then.

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

35

Again, as might be expected, the literature recognizes the critical role being played by new
technologies and their vulnerabilities, especially in information and communications. There has
been a sharp increase in attention paid to cyber/information topics in recent years, both as
technology and risk. Between 2003 and 2012, cybersecurity was cited 13 times, and in the years
that followed until 2019, almost tripled to 35, as shown in Figures 6 and 7.
Figure 6.

Cyber/Information Mentions of Tech Type by Year
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Figure 7.

Cyber Mentions of Risk Type by Year

The area of greatest national concern is the increasing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI), which
has created new vulnerabilities that are recognized as a major security issue for all transportation
modes, as well as many other sectors. Not only is it listed by the TSA as one of the major trends,
but Daniel Coates, Director of National Intelligence, ranked it first in a list of global threats. He
noted its use against global shipping and pointed out that it is a continuing and increasing
problem. 139
Despite the great emphasis on this issue by the US government and other agencies, including the
IMO, which issued specific guidelines in 2017, it is widely acknowledged that this vital sector has
failed to adopt adequate measures to deal with the cyber threat so that it has to play “catchup.” 140
According to another expert: “it’s no secret the maritime industry is behind the time when it comes
to cybersecurity, but there are encouraging signs.” 141 Soon after this comment, on July 18, 2019,
the US Coast Guard issued a warning following a cyber incident that impacted a ship bound for
the port of New York. Noting that “cyber security awareness is low to non-existent,” it urged “ship
owners to conduct robust cyber security assessments of the vessels.” Doing so, it must be noted, is
no simple matter given the nature of the crews who are usually on temporary contracts and the
need to safeguard onshore facilities, including company headquarters. 142 Several articles in the
literature considered such issues, namely the need to control vessels and facilities, as well as the
importance of ensuring cargo security. Yet, if the maritime sector is to attain a significant level of
security, a new orientation by the managers and operators is required, for its high degree of
vulnerability has been attributed to “its lack of encryption, increased use of computer services, a
lack of standardized training in and awareness of cybersecurity among crew, the sheer cost…and
industry-wide complacence…” 143
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That technologies pose a threat to maritime security is recognized in the literature. When
technology was analyzed by type, cargo control technologies (24%) ranked second to cybersecurity
(59%). In addition, one might reasonably conclude that many of the authors who discussed the
impact of technology on vessels and vehicles, which ranked third with 7%, were also concerned
with ship security.
Criminal actors have also recognized the ways in which technology can enhance the effectiveness
of their activities, though as has been noted, the literature has not accorded it the degree of
attention that it deserves. Businesses and governments have long regarded such acts as issues of
great concern, for they threaten the integrity of supply chains which are subject to widespread
theft, product substitution and falsification. Already commonplace in many countries and for
numerous supply chains, they represent major security issues, especially given their often-deadly
consequences. Many countries are struggling to deal with this problem by adopting policies to
ensure the integrity of their supply chains. In the US, for example, The Food and Drug
Administration issued a draft guidance on June 30, 2017, regarding product identification under
the Drug Supply Chain Security Act in an attempt to safeguard the security of that critical supply
chain. The rapid development of blockchain technology is widely expected to minimize such
threats and is being increasingly adopted by many businesses.144
This is another area that deserves more attention, for it is necessary to differentiate among types
of supply chains and their different transportation systems. Yet the literature that we analyzed
focused primarily on the generic supply chains; none dealt with drugs or food, for example, though
hazardous materials and energy were mentioned.
Other technological developments, notably the adoption of containers to move goods, have created
new security challenges. How to ensure their security has been an area of major concern, and the
US and the IMO have adopted a number of relevant policy measures, such as Customs–Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) and Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002
(MTSA) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Not surprisingly,
given the overwhelming attention paid to the maritime sector, container security received
considerable attention.
Containers are not only an important security issue in their own right, but they have also
contributed greatly to the emergence and implementation of a new vision of transportation, intermodalism, which presents its own security issues. It became increasingly obvious that the
advantages of moving containers by land as well as by sea necessitated a new approach, that the
traditional approach to transportation that treated each mode separately no longer sufficed, and
that it had, in fact, contributed to many problems, ranging from pollution to the inefficient
movement of goods and people. Accordingly, in 1991 the US Congress enacted the landmark
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). Over time, this new approach has led
to the emergence of a more efficient and cost-effective system that also possesses new
vulnerabilities. Even if the impact of the future trends discussed above on the security of
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transportation systems is carefully analyzed, it is essential to recognize that the breakdown of any
component of the intermodal system can have devastating repercussions for the entire supply chain.
Ensuring the security of this system is also more challenging because of its size and complexity.
Not only are intermodal terminals, a critical node in the system, attractive targets, but traditional
security challenges are complicated by problems of coordination and integration of the many
different categories of workers who flow in and out. And, though the terminals are critical, an
attack on the trucks that carry raw materials, or to the maritime transport to and from port, can
also lead to major disruptions. 145 Yet, the bibliography that was analyzed revealed a very limited
amount of relevant works, though a few viewed existing infrastructural patterns and practices such
as transfer points as areas of risk. In this field, too, the issue of conceptual clarity complicates
analyses, for such terms as multi-modal and synchromodal are also commonly used.

4.3 Policy and Security
Although this literature possesses rich discussions of how to enhance the security of the various
transport modes, albeit primarily the maritime, the degree to which these have been adopted and
implemented by key actors remains unclear and deserves further attention.
Furthermore, supply chain operators generally continue to place business considerations ahead of
security. They seek to protect their interests by eliminating internal risks and redundancy so as to
improve the efficiency of their operations. By doing so, they hope to remain competitive and to
grow their customer base. Hence, they are generally interested in using emerging technologies,
such as automated vehicles, drones, and improved tracking and GPS software to improve their
ability to track goods and transfer them as quickly as possible. However, doing so may contribute
little to enhanced security.
Even when there is a recognition of the need to adopt technological innovations for security
reasons, other factors can make such innovations difficult. Each supply chain has its own
organizational structure and administrative decision-making processes, and such factors as how
these processes function, including the role and power of various administrators, can all determine
whether security enhancing measures will be adopted. It has been noted, for example, that if
cybersecurity is to be enhanced, “digital supply chain officers need to be seen and heard.” 146
Clearly, management is a key factor and, as noted above, has received considerable attention in the
literature that was analyzed. When the major supply chain issues were being discussed, three
emerged: risks, security and management. Management received 36 mentions, placing it second
to security, which received 48 mentions. Risk assessment also received 36 mentions, and it should
be noted that how effectively these elements are conducted is also a function of management. The
extent to which management is a critical issue emerges even more clearly when the policies that
have been implemented are analyzed.
Essentially supply chain managers have two options when seeking to enhance security in their
transportation systems—to act proactively by adopting policies designed to minimize perceived
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

39

risk(s) or reactively after some incident; the latter is the common pattern. As in the maritime case,
supply chain security measures tend to be adopted reactively, sometimes in response to unforeseen
developments. The former is primarily the result of regulations imposed by local, national, regional
and global governmental organizations. These have obviously increased significantly in recent years
as governments reacting to the disruptions and ever-changing threats have adopted numerous
policies to safeguard supply chains generally, and transportation systems specifically. These
policies, however, have proven to be of varying effectiveness, and how to improve them poses
ongoing challenges, not least of which is how to enhance the willingness of supply chain
stakeholders, with their different perspectives and interests, to act proactively.
The importance of acting in this manner to enhance supply chain security is widely recognized by
business organizations and academics.147 Not only does it minimize the impact of a negative event,
but it has proven to be a cost-effective approach to doing so. As Deloitte concluded after an analysis
of the impact of the disruptions, 85% of the companies that it surveyed agreed that “proactive risk
management in the supply chain has shown to be a cost-effective approach. Companies that
indicated that they proactively manage supply chain risk spend 50 percent less to manage supplier
disruptions than companies that stated that they aren’t proactive.” 148
Acting proactively can contribute to another important element to supply chains generally and
transportation systems specifically—resilience. This too, has become a theme that has been widely
promoted by business organizations and has attracted growing attention in academic circles. Only
two articles were published between 2006 and 2008, but in 2017 the number had climbed to 25,
for a total of 95, almost half of which were published in transportation journals. 149
The importance of this topic was recently underlined by the recent National Academies Press
publication Freight Transportation Resilience in Response to Supply Chain Disruptions, which
contains a detailed analysis of the topic. Its stated goal is to provide information that will help
stakeholders implement policies that will enhance system resiliency. As part of this effort, it
identified the major factors within a supply chain that could impact transport resiliency—the
physical infrastructure, logistical, financial, communications, regulatory and institutional elements.
Of these elements, one emerged as the key—“effective interagency and intergroup communication
was identified by many in the literature as being the most important input into effective resiliency
strategies.” 150
Each of these elements is a critical one. Effective security policies require cooperation and
integration across numerous national agencies, and between local, national, and international
organizations, and the private sector. The challenge of interagency cooperation at the national level
is reflected by how the 2018 Transportation Sector Activities Program, 151 which evaluated the state
of transportation security, was prepared. Jointly issued by the US Department of Transportation
(DOT), the TSA and the US Coast Guard, the specific relationships and responsibilities were as
follows: “the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) as Co-Sector Specific Agencies (Co-SSAs) for the Transportation
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Systems Sector. DHS delegates its Co-SSA responsibilities to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). DOT, TSA, and the USCG
jointly perform the Co-SSA functions through a steering group and co-leadership of Government
Coordinating Councils (GCCs).” 152
It found that the security programs had earned an overall score of 3.6 out of 5, the lowest (3.2) was
awarded to “enhancing the all-hazards preparedness and resilience of the global transportation
system to safeguard US national interests.” 153 It also made various recommendations to improve
security levels. Its second-lowest stated, “increase sector engagement across the following five
proposed focus areas: private sector engagements, modal dependencies and interdependencies,
supply chain resilience, exercise integration, and intersections with international programs.” 154
Various government agencies and related organizations have, for years, attempted to engage with
the private sector. Their efforts have included numerous publications designed to provide guidance
to supply chain operators so as to enhance the security of their transportation systems.155 However,
as the report acknowledges, serious gaps remain between the desire of governments to enact
policies that enhance security and the willingness of supply chain and transport companies to adopt
various measures that will enhance security and resiliency, and apply them rigorously. The
recommendations identify areas that clearly need attention. However, their successful execution
will be no simple matter.
Surprisingly, one organization that could be very helpful has played a minor role, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), which is responsible for evaluating and monitoring federal programs.
A sophisticated European study of its activities between 2005 and 20015 drew conclusions that
were not only aligned with the findings of the literature review but also pointed out the same
weaknesses and issues that were enumerated above. 156
First, it found that the major concerns, as reflected in the number of reports, were supply chain
security (38%) and maritime security (33%). It explicitly noted the lack of attention to road and
rail transport and noted, “it would be reasonable if future GAO research or studies by other
organizations also addressed these currently neglected modes of transport…Also the existing
GAO reports largely overlook important supply chain security themes such as cyber security and
supply chain resilience.” 157 Furthermore, it pointed out that the reports’ “recommendations on
information management also urge the agencies to collaborate more actively with one another and
with their fellow foreign organizations.” 158 Finally, it should be noted that little seems to have
changed in recent years. A search of the GAO website listed only three reports dealing with
transportation—air quality, funding, and US interests in the Arctic. 159
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V. Findings from the Workshop
On January 9–10, 2020, Mineta Transportation Institute researchers convened a workshop on
"Surface Transportation Supply Chain Security," bringing together subject matter experts from
international, federal and state governments, the private sector, and academic researchers. The goal
of the conference was to understand and evaluate the current state of the practice in surface
transportation supply chain security and to consider areas of needed research to address existing as
well as new and developing challenges. Areas of focus included risk estimation, geopolitical aspects,
modal relations and cybersecurity.
The keynote speaker was Professor Joseph Szyliowicz of the University of Denver, with
presentations on geopolitical challenges by CAPT Manual Raras, USCG (Ret.); security planning
by CDR Romulus Matthews, USCG; and maritime management cybersecurity by LCDR Robert
Cole, USCG. The impact of power outages on supply chains was presented by COL Mitch
Medigovich, CANG (Ret.), deputy director of the California Office of Emergency Services.
Challenges of cargo security and port management was presented by Kevin Krick of Matson Lines.
Ash Padwal of Allied Telesis discussed cybersecurity and related future challenges. Gzim
Ocakoglu, European Union representative to the United States, reviewed the strategies employed
by European nations to achieve supply chain security. Jan Benini, retired from the US Department
of Transportation, provided the dinner speech on the work of regional organizations such as the
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group, the Transported Asset Protection Association
(TAPA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in supply chain security.
Discussants for the workshop included Daniel Goodrich, Senior Transportation Security Scientist
and adjunct professor at MTI; Herby Lissade, Deputy Director, Caltrans; and CDR
Greg Callaghan, USCG. Professor Frances Edwards, deputy director of the Allied Telesis
National Transportation Security Center, MTI, was the facilitator for the event.
The outcome of the workshop was the creation of the following products: a blueprint for future
research in surface transportation supply chain security, supported by bibliographies developed by
Professor Szyliowicz and two graduate students, Liz Lange and Autumn Anderton, and by
Professor Goodrich.

5.1 Supply Chain Security Resilience
Achieving resilience in global supply chains—a widely accepted necessity—requires dealing with
the vulnerabilities of complex modal and intermodal systems. 160 In the sections that follow, the
workshop’s findings regarding the vulnerabilities inherent in sea and land-based supply chain
transportation systems, the policies that have been implemented by the US and other actors to deal
with existing and potential threats and the challenges that remain are presented.
In the critical maritime sector, minimizing vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience is complicated
by the fact that ports are optimized by cargo type. For example, Los Angeles and Long Beach are
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built around container shipping of goods imported from Asia, while Oakland is a container port
with a focus on food exports. For the surface transportation supply chain to be fully resilient, the
US Coast Guard (USCG) needs to be able to reroute ships for security reasons, but what is the
ability to shift cargo to another port? Between the port organization around cargo type and the
manufacturing sector’s focus on just-in-time supply chains, shifting a ship’s port calls to another
location is problematic. It might be possible to make changes over a short term, such as for
immediate response to a natural hazard event, but over the long term there would be unwanted
impacts on the larger delivery system and supply chain. 161
Hurricane Sandy had just such an impact on the Port of New York and New Jersey, the thirdlargest port in the US and the largest on the east coast. Although several plans were in place to
manage weather notifications, port operations planning and maritime security, due to the size of
the storm and the storm surge that was generated, these were inadequate. The port was closed on
October 28, 2012, due to the storm predictions, and for an additional ten days afterwards owing
to the severity of the flooding. Even after the port reopened, damage and loss of power kept other
container facilities idle. Moreover, the USCG’s resources at Sandy Hook, Staten Island and
Bayonne were not fully operational for weeks due to facility and infrastructure damage. 162
Loss of power and the resulting loss of fuel were early challenges that required the cooperation of
the private sector. A private terminal operator gave gasoline to National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) staff so that their boat could continue recovery operations. Restarting
port services was facilitated by a public-private partnership between the private port pilot service
and NOAA and the USCG’s Sector New York personnel. The private pilots stayed in the harbor
during the storm, quickly began operations and carried their federal partners through the port to
conduct the harbor surveys, which in turn facilitated the reopening of less damaged areas.
Ports cannot operate without surface transportation to move the cargo once it is off-loaded, so
that, although the pier was clear, the storm surge, flooding and loss of power made the surface
movement of goods difficult, as roadways were clogged with debris. Cargo containers were picked
up by the flooding and floated around the harbor creating navigation hazards and damaging the
contents. Cargo ships bound for the Port of New York and New Jersey were redirected to the large
container port complex at Norfolk that had suffered less storm damage. Ships stranded at sea by
the storm were redirected to berths at Baltimore and the Port of Virginia.163
Even lesser storms can cause major disruptions, as shown by the even more complex impact of
Hurricane Harvey in 2017 on the Port of Houston. The second biggest port by tonnage (after Port
of Louisiana on the Mississippi), it is the largest petro-chemical complex, shipping 38% of US
gasoline exports and serves a petroleum and chemical industry economy. Though less damaged
than the Port of New York and New Jersey had been by Hurricane Sandy, with no visible damage
to containers or cranes, the port was closed for seven days while the ship channel was dredged.
Ships awaiting berths had nowhere to be diverted. Thus, its closure impacted national and
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international oil supplies 164 and created significant resilience challenges along all the supply chains
and their transportation systems.
Since surface transportation is a 24-hour operation with no surge capacity, all its elements must be
working for the surface transportation supply chain to function. 165 In the Bay Area, the Association
of Bay Area Governments has estimated that 1,700 road segments would be damaged by a regional
earthquake, disrupting the movement of vehicles throughout the Bay Area,166 including trucks to
and from the Port of Oakland, which is a major food exporter. Some of the food is fresh and
delivery-time sensitive. Refrigerated containers have to be powered to preserve the contents, but
natural disasters often disrupt local power supplies. Refrigerated containers on ships waiting to be
off-loaded have to be monitored to ensure that the power continues to be provided, but if the
container is on the third tier or above, it cannot be monitored. Shippers are seeking a technologybased monitoring system, but then it would be vulnerable to cyber-attack. The loss of power to
refrigerated containers would mean more than the loss of luxury food. For example, all the milk
distributed in Hawaii arrives from refrigerated cargo containers that would be vulnerable to loss of
power. 167
Interstate 10 (I-10) serves the Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach and ends at Jacksonville,
Florida. Eighty miles east of the California port, the interstate highway goes through the Cajon
Pass, which lies between the San Gabriel Mountains and the San Bernardino Mountains. This rift
created by the movement of the San Andreas Fault is the US “land bridge,” I-10, carrying the rail
and truck supply chain from the port to inland distribution centers, all the way to the east coast
connections to Europe. It is a point of vulnerability for the supply chain, especially if the San
Andreas Fault were to rupture there again, or if terrorists undertook sabotage. Blocking I-10 could
have major consequences, for it would create a denial of service for the ports and the stoppage of
the supply chain. Nor is there any easy workaround since the closest transcontinental route is I80, 380 miles to the north, which connects San Francisco to New York City. 168
Another threat to surface transportation supply chain resiliency is the cargo itself. Dangerous
goods are moved in containers, raising issues related to their regulation and stowage. Fireworks,
cigarette lighters and lithium batteries all present a potential threat to the goods sharing the
container and even to the adjacent containers. E-commerce has no supply chain integrity, with
shippers and consolidators often unsure of the dangerous goods regulations governing their cargo.
In addition, to avoid extra costs and hazardous materials licenses, shippers may intentionally
mislabel or mis-declare dangerous goods. 169
Personnel can also pose a threat to the resilience of the surface transportation supply chain. In the
maritime segment of the supply chain, crew members come from many nations, predominantly
from India, Indonesia and the Philippines. Large container ships have relatively small crews
because of the automation of many of the ship’s operations. The New York Times notes that the
mega cargo ships are “the pack horses of globalization, carrying $13 trillion in goods, representing
70% of total freight worldwide.” 170 The cargo containers are stacked ten layers below deck and ten
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levels above deck. The crew numbers only 20 to 30 personnel, about half officers and half crewmen.
At any time, there are about 1.2 million mariners at sea. 171
Under normal circumstances, crew members are at sea for about four months at a time. Ship
management firms arrange for a crew member to join the ship, work the contract, and be flown
home from the next possible port at the contract’s end. During the long cruises, morale is
important, so the shipping line is expected to provide games, entertainment and communications
capabilities for the crew. This is in conformance with both union contracts and international
conventions on mariners’ comfort. However, mariner interactions with the technology systems can
easily lead to a loss of ship security, as when a crew member charging a cell phone introduced a
virus into the ship’s systems, causing the loss of the navigation charts. Thus, it is widely
acknowledged that cyber systems pose a unique security challenge. 172
To meet all the challenges enumerated above, the primary actors in the maritime enterprise—
USCG, port facility managers, cargo forwarders, ship owners, utility providers and cyber systems
users—need to develop vulnerability and resilience metrics for the complex systems involved in
Surface Transportation Supply Chain Security (STSCS). The interrelated systems rely on each
element operating successfully to achieve the safe and secure delivery of goods in the surface supply
chain. 173 One strategy might be the application of the National Academy of Sciences’ measures of
resilience to the STSCS sector. Their report, Disaster Resilience, suggests that four functions
define resilience: (i) planning and preparation, (ii) absorption, (iii) recovery, and (iv) adaptation.174
These closely match the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s four phases of emergency
management: planning, response, recovery and mitigation.175 The various USCG initiatives use
these elements for maritime security, but other transportation modes in the supply chain may need
a more intentional approach to developing policies that support resilience.

5.2 State of the Practice in Maritime Transportation Supply Chain Security
The US Department of Transportation’s national maritime strategy, “Goals and Objectives for a
Stronger Maritime Nation: A Report to Congress,” issued in February 2020, included four new
goals, focused on the role of the maritime sector in national security and the economy:
• “Goal 1: Strengthen U.S. Maritime Capabilities Essential to National Security and
Economic Prosperity
• Goal 2: Ensure the Availability of a U.S. Maritime Workforce that Will Support the
Sealift Resource Needs of the National Security Strategy
• Goal 3: Support Enhancement of U.S. Port Infrastructure and Performance
• Goal 4: Enable Maritime Industry Innovation in Information, Automation, Safety,
Environmental Impact and Other Areas.” 176
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In placing resiliency ahead of efficiency, the strategy reinforced the Jones Act’s importance in
maintaining domestic sea routes in American hands, encouraging the development of a more
robust maritime capability for Sealift Command, development of private sector infrastructure, and
the key security role of US flagged vessels. 177 These factors are critical as the US is faced with a
growing set of geopolitical challenges to its surface transportation security, notably from China.
Geopolitical Challenges
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, using airplanes as
missiles, the US Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in
November of 2002. It lists security standards for US ports and for all vessels that use them. The
USCG was given the responsibility to monitor anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports and to
provide training for foreign port leaders who want to improve their security. In July, 2004, the
regulations to implement the MTSA were approved. The goals are to prevent loss of life, damage
to the environment, economic disruption and transportation system disruption. 178 The Coast
Guard and Transportation Security Administration jointly manage the Transportation Worker
Identification Card (TWIC) program that uses background checks and security threat assessments
to evaluate the potential for threats and issue cards for mariners and transportation workers with
access to MTSA vessels and port facilities. 179
In response to the potential for ships being used for terrorism, the United Nations’ International
Maritime Organization (IMO) created the ISPS to minimize the likelihood of ships being used
as weapons in terrorist attacks. For example, “gas ships might be hijacked and blown up in busy
ports.” 180 The code was implemented “through the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 chapter XI-2 to enhance maritime security,” 181 and came into force on July
1, 2004. 182 The IMO made these actions international requirements for security programs in
shipping companies, in ports and on the ships to protect against terrorism and piracy. The cost of
implementation of the security planning and equipping by the ship owners and port operators is
borne by freight shippers through an ISPS fee.183
A port has to meet ISPS requirements for international shipping to call. Once a ship calls at a nonISPS port, it may be denied access to ISPS ports. The ISPS requires trained security leaders for
every vessel, port and maritime company, with the goal to deter piracy, terrorism, stowaways and
any tampering with the safety of the ship or crew. 184
The way that the US works with foreign countries on port security depends on local agreements.
Counter-terrorism work is uniformly supported in the world’s major ports, but countering drug
trafficking is harder because of government corruption, enabling drug cartels to buy influence in
some host nations. Criminal enterprises may also be influential in the port through bribery of
officials or influence in the labor unions. There also has to be an agreement between the US and
the port’s government regarding the level of threat from different vessels that is acceptable. For
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example, a Russian flag ship may be viewed as a threat in the US and Canada, but not in another
country. Sometimes there is a reason to withhold enforcement and see the criminal network in
action to allow for arrests rather than to initiate deterrent action. 185
Domestic and foreign politics and regimes, trade agreements and escalation of violence quickly
change the security landscape in maritime transportation. TWIC provide some ability to identify
who is authorized to enter a port, but enforcement is a shared responsibility between the port and
the national government of the port. Often nations were built around their ports, and even today,
in some places, residents are integrated into ports, and cargo is stored in neighborhoods in Africa
and southwest Asia. Since such arrangements do not comply with the security elements of the
ISPS, these ports cannot be used for international trade until ISPS compliance is achieved. Port
security improvements since the 9/11 attacks on the US are notable, and the US has tried to extend
its port security regimes to other nations through diplomacy. However, other nations remain
focused on issues of concern within their societies. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia have cards
that say, “Drug trafficking is punishable by death.” Still, despite all such efforts, crime is still a
vulnerability throughout the maritime supply chain, especially the human elements. 186
Deterring human trafficking is particularly challenging in foreign ports. Security monitors tend to
trust the manifest for the container. Some containers get X-rayed by US Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP) officers, but only those being imported into the US All containers get scanned for
radiation. Most ships have a foreign flag, foreign operator, and foreign crew, so port security has
to rely on worldwide intelligence gathering about criminal enterprises to disrupt human trafficking
using cargo containers. If there is nothing intelligence-driven, the container is put on a truck to its
destination. 187
As has been noted, container ships are growing in size. In May of 2020, the largest container ship
was the HMM Algeciras, at 1,312 feet long and 200 feet wide, own by Hyundai Merchant Marine.
The ship was built in South Korea and flagged in Panama. On its maiden voyage, it stopped at the
Port of Rotterdam on June 3 with a record load of 19,621 TEUs, but it is capable of carrying
23,964. Unloading the mega-ships requires carefully choreographed coordination of port, crane
and trucks, creating severe limitations on container scanning time frames. Container security
inspections are run by CBP, while port security compliance with ISPS is overseen by the USCG.
Chinese Maritime Silk Road and Ports
Within the framework of these regimes, international trade involves a variety of vessels calling at
multiple ports around the world. The management of ports has become highly sophisticated, with
the need to enforce the international laws, and with the use of high-speed cranes that are cyber
enabled to connect the ship manifest to the truck or train that will move the goods from the port. 188
Ports must provide not only berthing for ships and unloading capacity, but also cyber systems and
connectivity.

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

47

China has undertaken the ownership or management of ports around the world. In some cases,
the mainland Chinese maritime giant COSCO has bought out port contracts of Hong Kongbased entities. This raised security concerns within the US, and Chinese ownership ended in many
cases. A good example is the Port of Long Beach, which gets 90% of its containerized cargo from
Asia. 189 For thirty years, the Port of Long Beach, the second largest containerized port in the U.S,
was owned by Hong Kong-based Orient Overseas International (OOI). The COSCO shipping
empire acquired majority shareholder status in OOI in 2017, causing the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)—of which the Coast Guard is a part—to raise concerns. In 2019 the
port was bought by a North American private equity fund called Macquarie Infrastructure Partners
under an agreement between COSCO, DHS and the US Department of Justice, which included
a commitment from OOI and COSCO to use Long Beach for port and rail services for the next
20 years. 190 This ended a 40-year lease on the Long Beach Container Terminal that was signed
with OOI in 2012, before the COSCO buy-in. 191
China aspires to build a Maritime Silk Road to support its global trade. The warm water route will
travel from Fuzhou, China to Vietnam, and along the coast of the Indian Ocean to Iran, and Kenya
on the south, to the Suez Canal, to Mediterranean ports, ending in Italy. China is planning to add
a polar extension to its Maritime Silk Road projects, connecting its port at Dailan on the Pacific
directly to Rotterdam.192
In a 2019 Congressional hearing, Carolyn Bartholomew, chair of the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, noted that control of ports in Africa, Europe and Asia gives China
an advantage in logistics supply chains, especially the import of raw materials for its manufacturing
economy and its export of finished products. China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative extends
existing commercial contracts through loans to domestic entities and purchases of port facilities. 193
China has a controlling interest in two-thirds of the 50 largest container ports in the world,
including investments in Los Angele and Seattle. Through its acquisition of a 49% stake in French
Terminal Link, it also controls the US ports of Miami and Houston. 194
Additional vulnerabilities noted in the 2019 hearing included that the gantry cranes needed to
unload the large container ships in US ports are made in China. Further, the US does not own or
control ships needed to refuel US Navy vessels. California Congressman John Garamendi
sponsored a bill requiring the construction of 50 US constructed and flagged refueling vessels. 195
To counter the Maritime Silk Road, the US military needs to complete a National Maritime
Strategy that examines all aspects of maritime supply chain security. Lt. Gen. Giovanni Tuck,
responsible for the movement of US troops abroad, noted that while the USCG maintains physical
security for ports, “we're talking about the resiliency of a port and the cyber threat that can go with
that, including with these mega cranes.” 196 Chinese programming of the gantry cranes’ operating
systems leaves room for bots and malicious code to be introduced into their cyber-based operating
systems.197
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Port management companies from Dubai and China dominate the container shipping industry. 198
Modern ports have highly complex infrastructures, including reliance on cyber systems. For
example, Busan, South Korea, relies on a GPS-dependent surface transportation system. Threats
such as GPS spoofing exist when ships are navigating in the harbor. China had a spoofing incident
in Shanghai, although it may have been due to a bandwidth problem rather than intentional
hacking. Nevertheless, the challenge for maritime security remains.
China uses 5G broadband (a more robust network for moving data) widely in its ports. Of more
concern, they have also developed their own GPS system called Beidou. After two decades of
development, the final satellite was placed in orbit in June of 2020. 199 Mariners might be required
to use the Chinese system in Chinese waters. Receiving information from the Chinese system
would be acceptable, but transmitting could be an intelligence concern. 200
The Maritime Silk Road initiative goes beyond simple port access. Chinese investment in Africa
and Central America includes building soccer stadiums, hospitals and roads. Chinese workers and
companies install everything; then, the debt has to be repaid by the host nation. Ports in Eastern
Africa provide the Chinese military with the ability to land blue water navy vessels. These new
commercial ports around the world offer Chinese military units global reach for logistical support.
The projects can also generate new relationships with small nations that can later be used for
Chinese benefit. For example, the Chinese build a fish processing plant as an economic
development project, lending the money for the construction. The debt is slowly repaid to China,
and the country now has a debt diplomacy relationship to China, a situation which is most notable
in Oceania. Cruise ship terminals built to enhance the influx of foreign currency and grow the local
economy can also accommodate a naval destroyer for port calls and resupply. 201
The Chinese are developing similar relationships in Europe, owning large terminals in Brussels,
for example. The new port serving Athens is an example of Mediterranean debt diplomacy. They
go to a nation when it has financial vulnerabilities and build-zones of influence. Thus, the Chinese
bought Piraeus, a small port outside of Athens, during the Greek debt crisis, made it a modern
container port, and undercut the Greek shipping magnates, cutting out the main Port of Athens.
In 2019 China agreed to a further 660 million Euro investment in Piraeus by COSCO to create a
hub for Asia-to-Europe shipping, with the goal to make it the largest container port in Europe. 202
Ports and roads in the western Balkans were built using Chinese labor to undercut local bidders.
The cost-saving and new infrastructure initially make the local leaders happy, but the outstanding
debt creates political influence for China. 203
The Melting Arctic
Another pressing geopolitical issue is the development of new trade routes through the melting
Arctic Ocean. The summer retreat of the ice for up to 75 days has permitted the development of
the northern coast of Russia, including the exploitation of mineral resources. Trade routes linking
Vladivostok on the Pacific coast with the Yamal Liquid Natural Gas Project on the north coast
can operate through the summer, shortening the trip to Asian customers. The Russian icebreaker
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fleet has developed with both nuclear powered and diesel-powered vessels. Russia has created
floating nuclear power plants to support the commercialization of the northern coast, with plans
for additional installations. 204
Russia is exploiting the Arctic for military purposes. New deployments of naval and air forces
menace Alaska and raise concerns about the passage through the Bering Sea. Guided missile patrol
ships have been added to the Russian Arctic fleet. Land-based exercises have included the
deployment of troops who walked across the peninsula from Cape Vankarem to Egvekinot as part
of the Vostok 2018 event. 205
The Russian telecommunications company Mega-fon is a partner with Cinia, a Finnish firm, in
developing a new submarine fiber optic cable that will run along Russia’s northern coast, not in
territorial waters, but along its continental shelf. The Arctic Connect Project will add an 18,000
km cable to connect Europe, Asia and the US. The Chinese have expressed an interest in this
project as part of their One Belt, One Road system. 206 The planned cable will run to Hokkaido,
Beijing, Vladivostok, Kamchatka, through the Being Strait into the Arctic Ocean and along
Russia’s northern shore. 207
The melting Arctic ice is also opening the fabled Northwest Passage, from the Atlantic to
Hudson’s Bay and across the northern coast of Canada to Alaska’s North Slope oil fields. Passage
through the Bering Strait connects the Arctic Ocean to the northern Pacific Ocean. These new
trade routes are leading to sovereignty disputes among the nations with Arctic Ocean frontage, the
“coastal states.” The US and Canada have issues with boundaries in the Beaufort Sea. A much
bigger concern is Russia’s claims to the major European trade route where the Baltic states also lay
claims. 208 Under international law, all coastal states have a three-mile limit that is national territory,
which is measured from the low tide mark, or the farthest point of the harbor infrastructure, out
to sea. Under the United Nation’s Convention on the Law of the Sea, nations have another 12
nautical miles of territorial sea where they control the air space, seabed and subsoil. Ships may
engage in innocent passage, but not in any commercial, fishing or landing activities without the
permission of the state. 209 An exclusive economic zone then extends for another 200 nautical miles
where the coastal state has control of fishing and extraction industries.210 It is this zone that causes
the most overlap of national sovereignty as the lines of longitude converge.
On the Pacific side of the Arctic Ocean, there is only the Bering Strait to provide access between
the two oceans. With a frozen Arctic, there was little need for vessels to move into the Arctic
Ocean through the strait. Now that Russia’s northern shore is developing extraction industries, the
demand for seasonal passage by tankers and supply ships is increasing. Since the navigable
passageway is relatively narrow, it is possible to imagine a time when the strait will be as crowded
as the Strait of Malacca, with ships lining up for days to await their turn to pass through. Clearly,
the melting Arctic poses a variety of geopolitical challenges for the twenty-first century.211

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

50

Maritime Management Security Challenges
Maritime management poses a variety of security challenges. Experts have described its ecosystem
as a trade-driven challenge. Fixed assets such as ports, cranes and warehouses are working with
mobile assets such as ships, trucks and rail cars to move goods across the supply chain. The
economic impact of this ecosystem is significant, with the western US ports managing $1 trillion
a year in import and export goods. 212 These goods are used in the US manufacturing sectors, as
well as exported again from east coast ports to Europe.
Components of Port Security
The USCG’s 11th District covers all of California. Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach combined is
the largest container port in the US, and ninth largest in the world. It received 16 million
containers in 2018; 43% of western US refined oil products come from this port, as do 75% of
California’s. Three cruise lines operate out of the port. It has an automated terminal that can
handle mega-ships with high-speed cranes. Sector San Francisco includes the largest passenger
ferry fleet in California, carrying 10,000 people per day, and has the largest military outload port
in the state. The Port of Oakland is the fifth largest container port in the US, with 2 million
containers handled in 2018, and ships 25% of California’s refined gas products. 213 The Chinese
mega container ship, Benjamin Franklin, carrying 16,000 containers, visited the Port of Oakland
on New Year’s Eve, 2015, on its maiden voyage. 214 Sector San Diego is home to the US Navy’s
Pacific fleet and is the second-largest surface ship US Navy base in the world, with 54 ships. The
port generated $9.4 billion in economic impact to the region.215
A 2015 west coast port strike by the Longshoremen’s Union demonstrated the impact on the
economy of the loss of port capacity. Six days into the strike, manufacturers ran out of supplies due
to just-in-time management, which eschews stockpiling of components. The 30 striking west coast
ports cost the US economy $2 billion per day. “Longshoremen play an indispensable role 216in
getting 90 percent of consumer goods into the country—and they know how to use that to their
advantage.” 217
Providing security to such important facilities is a challenge because of the large attack surface
provided by the enormous amount of maritime trade. The elements include ports, terminals,
vessels, cargo, supply chain, people, and communications. It is a transaction-rich environment,
which attracts criminal elements. Security requires that maritime partners improve information
sharing related to threats and vulnerabilities and reduce known vulnerabilities through regular
reviews and improvements. A layered defense against security breaches includes continuous
monitoring and development of a resilient operational program.218
As with all industries, maritime shipping focuses on efficiency to enhance return on investment.
These improvements include automation of processes, the introduction of cyber capabilities that
enhance the ability to have remote access, monitoring and reporting, and the convergence of
activities and dependencies inherent in the internet of things (IOT). It is a difficult management
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decision over whether to prioritize efficiency by using outside contractors for these automated
activities, or to hire a more expensive in-house information technology staff to manage the cyberbased activities. The choice is between the superior capability and lower cost of contractors who
focus on one aspect of cyber and are specialists—but also could be the source of hostile cyber
incursions, versus the higher security of an in-house cyber management approach, but with
employees who must work across multiple cyber platforms. “Every additional layer introduces risks
that need to be managed.” 219
Security Laws and Regulations
Recognizing the security vulnerability of shipping, a variety of new laws and regulations were
introduced after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that used airplanes as bombs. 220 The opportunity to
use ships similarly to damage ports or disrupt the supply chain was recognized, and the US created
the US CBP program called Customs–Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) that was
begun in 2001. Its goal was building partnerships with other nations for inspections of goods in
the country of origin before they are shipped. Partnerships include importers and exporters,
customs brokers, freight consolidators, as well as trucking companies and shipping companies. In
2006 the program became law and now has 11,400 partners. 221 The MTSA, passed in 2002,
established maritime security levels.222 The MTSA regulations are published in 33 Code of Federal
Regulations 103, 104, 105, and 106, which lays out the security requirements for domestic port
facilities and US-flagged ships and certain offshore oil rigs. Naval Vessel Inspection Circulars
(NVIC) published periodically provide guidance to the industry. The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 requires that the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) must be notified in advance of all food imports to facilitate inspections. 223
The ISPS was adopted by the IMO in 2004. The USCG’s port security program was started in
2002–2003. The USCG accesses intelligence and analyzes world events to ascertain possible
threats to the supply chain. Program partners include 150 nations with coastal access, of whom 70
are active trade partners with the US. Countries are divided into three risk levels, with strict
enforcement for Tier 1 nations. 224
The ISPS regulates the ship-to-port interface. It relies on CBP to regulate the cargo through its
C-TPAT program. Within 96 hours in advance of arrival, a ship must notify the receiving port of
its cargo, passengers, crew, and other ports it has visited. CBP looks at people and cargo, while
USCG looks at ship history. Conditions of entry into the port for the ship are based on the
USCG’s evaluation of whether the ship is a risk to the port, including the security posture of the
ship’s previous ports of call. Being prevented from a timely entrance into the port costs money and
causes delays to market for the goods. A port security advisory may be issued, which may be due
to failure of the port of origin or last port of call to follow port security rules. If the port of origin
or last port of call does not comply with ISPS, shippers will not serve that port because of the
disruption to their later port calls.225
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The USCG can revisit the problematic port and provide capacity building guidance to clear it for
secure international trade. The USCG’s goal is compliance with the ISPS regulations, which it
enforces in foreign ports, using the “carrot” of trade with the US to encourage the development of
appropriate security standards. A port that cannot export may damage the local economy and even
impact national stability. US Agency for International Development and the Millennium
Corporation may help to fund compliance with ISPS Code, but it is left to ports to implement the
regulations by installing cameras, fences, and other security devices, with the goal to prevent a
breach. The USCG enforces the MTSA once the ship is in US waters. 226
Global peer pressure through allies helps to get ports in other nations to enhance their threat tier.
Tier 3 areas include all the nations of the European Union, Australia, Japan, and other trading
partners that are evaluated by intelligence estimates as low risk and whose ports have a low rate of
non-compliance with ISPS security requirements. Tier 2 includes most of the rest of the US’s
trading partner nations. Tier 1 is high risk areas, including Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Myanmar,
and any state sponsors of terrorism. The USCG tries to visit nations on the Tier 3 or 2 list to create
the conditions to enhance diplomacy through maritime trade. However, Eritrea, for example,
would not accept the invitation, so no ships from that country may enter US waters. The Arab
spring of 2010 took nations of North Africa from Tier 2 to Tier 1 until violence subsided. The
USCG was able to access Myanmar and explained how they could get their port to become part
of international trade, and they are working on meeting the requirements. When Cuba opened to
the west, the USCG worked with them to develop compliance with the ISPF for their ports. 227
US government classifies terrorist groups and nations tied to them, while the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) monitors the “narco” side. Ships coming from such ports are subject to
scrutiny under the ISPS. The USCG works to get cooperation on ship tracking. They use time
and distance to screen information provided under the ISPS as the ship transits to the US port.
USCG’s role at the intelligence table is to use the Maritime Operational Threat Response to
evaluate risk; and either formulate a plan to intercept the ship at the 200-mile limit or allow it to
make port and respond. The local Fusion Center evaluates the Advance Notice of Arrival provided
under the regulatory side; then, criminal evaluation may determine that a ship is a “vessel of
interest.” The threat type determines the response.228
Policy Development
After the 9/11 attacks on the US World Trade Center and Pentagon, new security regulations
were developed for many elements of transportation. For example, C-TPAT was expanded into
the supply chain, and new security criteria now include cyber and bioterrorism rules for food
imports. To qualify for C-TPAT designation, a shipper must demonstrate the documentation of
a power outage plan that enables the continuation of operations. The plan must encompass power
losses from system failures and weather impacts. All computer operations must use two-factor
authentication. 229 All ships using US ports are required to have an automated tracking system (AIS)
that allows the ship to be tracked using GPS. Each ship has a unique signal that broadcasts the
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ship’s name, course, speed and other details. It broadcasts 4,500 messages per minute, with a range
of 40 miles. This allows the USCG to monitor incoming vessel traffic for safety and security
purposes. 230 Maritime shipping companies are responsible for tracking their own communications
and having a process for dealing with reports of AIS and GPS spoofing incidents. 231
Cyber is another support system that must be included in security planning. Cyber monitoring is
conducted in McLean, Virginia, but defining maritime messages is a challenge. There are now
self-driving vehicles in maritime terminals that use cyber systems, a new cyber layer. There are few
American domestic shipping companies, and many US ports are run by foreign companies, which
compounds issues of control. Foreign entities are less likely to share information on cyber events
with USCG than American owners. The Jones Act states that all goods moved between two US
ports have to use US-built and owned ships. This provides layers of cybersecurity and integrity.
Servers, however, may be located away from the port, even in another country, creating an MTSA
enforcement problem. Shipping companies argue that moving computer servers out of the US is
often justified on the basis of cost and efficiency, but often it is to evade US regulations. Malaysia
and Indonesia port headquarters planned to carry out a cybersecurity demonstration in 2020 for
the USCG to prove that their locations are both secure and efficient. US domestic operators are
struggling to remain competitive with foreign shippers while also ensuring the security of their
systems. For example, Matson has to carry out their own inspections in China through C-TPAT
for customs. The process to approve foreign ownership of ports, ships, and logistics components
as part of a supply chain is complex and requires writing security requirements into contracts for
logistics support services.232
The US Coast Guard uses a variety of methods to ensure the security of US ports. The National
Targeting Center (NTC) is part of the Department of Homeland Security and run by US Customs
and Border Protection (CBP). It uses several software packages to track goods in the supply chain
for security. The US partners with many other nations to ensure the integrity of the maritime cargo
systems.233 For example, Columbia coordinates with the CBP on cargo monitoring. It puts GPS
trackers on its goods in transit from the factory forward, connects to NTC and tracks the goods in
the cargo container to the final destination, such as a Walmart distribution center.
Drug and drug component transporting and smuggling are also concerns for the international
supply chain system. Columbia, which was previously known as a major source of drugs smuggled
into the US, is now the most advanced national port system in Central America, with MTSA and
ISPS compliance. US diplomatic influence was used to develop alternate trade in legal goods, but
the national government now requires security regulations for all goods in commerce. Guatemala
and El Salvador are now the focus of concern as precursor drug providers.
While CBP monitors the movement of the containers, the USCG monitors the movement of
ships 234 of 300 gross tons or greater headed for a US port or traveling within 1,000 nautical miles
of the US coast, using the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Long Range
Identification and Tracking system (LRIT). The LRIT reports the ship’s location at least every
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six hours,235 and maintains a log of the ship’s voyage up to that time, allowing the USCG to
evaluate ships for threats. If a ship turns off the LRIT its voyage history is lost. Doing so is
suspicious, suggesting that it made unauthorized stops or used unauthorized routes. Other
approaches to ensure port security are used in other nations. For example, Israel takes fingerprints
and photographs every mariner arriving at an Israeli port. In California, the ports are linked to
local intelligence sharing groups (fusion centers) and share information about risks from
international flag port arrivals. 236
The ISPS/MTSA Security Compliance Targeting Matrix provides an analysis of ships’ voyage
histories. Ports of call history is a major concern for container ships since cargo containers could
have been tampered with. Ships that have made port calls at suspicious or poorly secured ports
may require extra scrutiny before being permitted to off-load goods or personnel at US ports. For
example, ports in the Philippines are not considered secure, so if a ship has gone to a port there
within the last five port calls, the USCG will place conditions of entry for the ship to enter any
American port. 237
The USCG works with US ports to evaluate security concerns, find deficiencies and create
solutions. A variety of plans are required for port facilities to minimize risk. Vessel Security Plans,
Facility Security Plans, and Area Maritime Security Plans each play a role in developing a more
secure port. The USCG Captain of the Port is in overall charge of all security operations of the
port and holds quarterly meetings of federal, state and local entities with an interest in port security
to assess the plans and strategies currently in place. The group uses scenarios such as a terrorism
event to evaluate the capabilities of that port to respond successfully to identified threats. The
exercise helps to disclose existing security deficiencies. Funding is available to ports to harden
systems and facilities against terrorist attacks, based on the Maritime Security Analysis model,
which offers methods for mitigating against those identified vulnerabilities. 238
Other policies and plans are required to reduce the risk of smuggling, human trafficking, cargo
theft and terrorist acts. American and foreign flag ships must take steps to prevent their vessels
from becoming the source of criminal or terrorist actions. Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circulars (NVICs) provide guidance to the maritime industry to comply with the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The Code of Federal Regulations (33 CFR 103, 104, 105)
requires the creation of security plans, implementation of security measures, and specific activities
for cargo handling. The High Interest Vessel Boarding Matrix helps USCG leadership to identify
target vessels based on intelligence. The USCG, Federal Marshals’ Service, Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and CBP respond together to investigate possible criminal activity or other
threats involving a suspect ship. 239

5.3 Cybersecurity Challenges
The vision of mariners at sea finding their way around the globe with the stars and a sextant is
now out of date. Today’s mega-ships navigate using GPS-enabled charts that require cyber
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technology to work. Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is a digital
version, multi-layer database that is now replacing the paper navigation chart. Ships use USBenabled data as back-ups, but in one instance, someone introduced a virus through cell phone
charging, which meant that the ship now had no chart. 240 ECDIS & GPS are not only essential
for navigating at sea, but they are also critical in the navigational channel area where a large vessel
is very vulnerable to navigation hazards. Other critical operating systems such as AIS, NAVTEX,
the ship’s speed log and fathometer are all tied to the ECDIS. 241
The maritime industry is deeply embedded with developing information technologies that create
efficiencies and safety in the management of maritime resources. Cyber-enabled operations,
automation of scheduling and crane operations, remote access to facilities, monitoring and
reporting are all part of the new maritime operations. New dependencies have been created by the
IOT, which makes every device a window into a ship’s operating system. For example, at the port
in Busan, South Korea, there is one operator for eight cranes, all controlled through computerbased systems, and autonomous vehicles are used on the port facility. Each poses a possible risk of
cyber-attack. 242 Ships are not the only maritime facilities vulnerable to cyber system failure. In
2010 an oil rig lost stability when it lost its cyber navigation systems. Since floating platforms
require navigation to stay in position, the oil rig suffered the loss of electric supply, loss of station
and had to make an emergency disconnect. 243 There were 14 computer viruses that corrupted the
primary navigational computer. 244
The challenge for management is to determine whether efficiency or security is the dominant
factor in IT system design. The increasing outsourcing of information technology (IT) systems
designs to specialized third parties is one option that gains efficiencies, while doing everything
with in-house staff may lose the benefits of specialization but provide a higher level of system
security. 245 For example, the APM Terminals in Rotterdam, a Maersk enterprise, suffered a Petya
ransomware attack on June 27, 2017, which may have been made possible by “loopholes” in the
cybersecurity systems.
The Maersk attack is believed to have started as a virus in a Ukrainian accounting software update,
which exploited a flaw in the Windows operating system. The company removed computers tied
to the regular network, but this action failed to prevent the stoppage of automated cargo operations
at numerous terminals. The security system at the marine terminal was also affected but able to
remain in compliance. 246 Worldwide, 17 terminals were impacted, and the only cure was to erase
the hard drive completely and restore the system with an uninfected back-up. Maersk found a
server in West Africa that had been off-line for service during the attack and used it to restore
services. This solution demonstrates the importance of maintaining some back-up capability offline since the malware can spread across the entire network. 247
During the attack, the IT systems used to schedule ship arrivals and cargo handling had to be
replaced with “paper and pencil systems.”248 When Maersk Shipping suffered its cyber-attack,
Matson Lines resorted to these old-fashioned systems at the port in Tacoma to manage their
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

56

operations. They have one ship two days a week at the port, so they were able to maintain
operations with manual work. Verizon experienced a loss of service in Oakland, a major port for
Matson, where they had an effective cyber-contingency plan. Their systems were segregated from
the main systems and included a cloud back-up on the east and west coasts.
Restoration requires knowing what normal looks like. What are the assets and how are they
connected? What are the latest configurations? Which users have to be brought back on-line? Are
there back-ups? For example, new chips in a ship’s engine operation system use cyber monitoring
to improve efficiency. Systems such as ballast can be impacted to manage the engine’s load for the
best operation. If the chip were hacked, the ballast water could rush to one side of the ship and
cause it to list, perhaps dangerously. 249
Cyber systems are also used to ensure that paperwork gets transmitted to support trade. The value
of data sharing is recognized along the supply chain, although shippers and operators want to retain
some power to decide who gets the data. Big corporations have software for data management, but
small vendors and suppliers have to manage the data exchange on their own. To do this, they have
to build the rules of the game—who is allowed to participate, contribute data, or get data? 250 Vessel
connections are a critical aspect of cybersecurity. Modern cargo vessels are largely operated by
computer-enabled systems that the crew interfaces with but does not directly control. Networks
on ships control navigation, propulsions, power, and communication. The whole of business
connections integrates the vessel with the marine terminal operations and landside facilities.
International headquarters’ IT systems are tied to the ship’s operating systems, which created
efficiency but also vulnerability.251
On September 27, 2018, the Port of San Diego was subjected to a ransomware attack, 252 suspected
to have been introduced to the network through a networked security camera system. Based on
their cybersecurity protocol, other systems voluntarily shut down to stop the spread of the
ransomware. No commercial impacts were felt at the port because there was little automation on
the cargo side. The attack affected San Diego Harbor Police operations, but the port was able to
remain in compliance with Facility Security Plans. 253
These events point out the need for data governance in the supply chain. How much is invested in
the pursuit of data security is determined by the evaluation of the risk to the systems. Doing so
requires attention to the three components of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Data
governance is intended to create information assurance via cybersecurity. Data governance is the
foundation of managing the supply chain and protecting its physical and intellectual property. 254
Data hygiene is essential to protect the systems from incursions, but the social norms of password
security and safe computer operation are not yet fully embedded in business culture. While double
passwords and frequent changes of passwords can be built into the computer access systems, there
is only so much that management can mandate. Information security has to become automatic for
users, both “right and left of boom,” before and after an attack, because, for the supply chain
industry, it is not a question of if, but when, an attack will occur. Cybersecurity market segments
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are becoming ever more important to the operation of modern vessels, ports and supply systems.
Devices, applications and networked data are all part of the supply chain ecology. All users have a
degree of dependency on cyber-moderated data. The role of the cybersecurity sector must be to
identify potential vulnerabilities, and when intrusions begin, protect, detect, respond, and rapidly
recover the systems. 255
Cybersecurity is a means to an end for safer transactions. Supply chains are increasingly dependent
on data flows, such as the logistics systems of users, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems, and regulatory systems. In the supply chain, the physical space and cyber space
have to interact together. Compromised elements can seep through the network routers. The
challenge is that the infrastructure depends on multiple data types, multiple data clouds, so the
question is, “what do you want to secure?” Is protecting everything sustainable? What are the
impacts of loss to the supply chain partners: suppliers, vendors, stakeholders, along the chain? 256
The answers dictate the type and level of the investments in cybersecurity.
The USCG has established the Office of Cyberspace Forces (CG-791) to oversee the safety and
security aspects of cyber systems in the maritime industry.257 The USCG provides guidance on
how to protect cyber systems through NVICs, thus enhancing the ability of the field personnel in
carrying out inspections and other regulatory actions. 258 One such effort is the Draft Facilities
Cyber NVIC issued by the Office of Port and Facility Compliance (CG-FAC), 259 which the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) characterizes as major rulemaking since this regulation
when published, will give the USCG oversight of computers in maritime-related facilities. 260 This
new NVIC is intended as an awareness tool to make the maritime industry partners aware of the
requirement to include “radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and
networks, in facility security assessments.”261 The USCG has also developed a draft of an NVIC
on cyber systems on vessels. The IMO already requires ships to address computers in their security
plans, and cyber systems are supposed to be covered in safety management systems for cargo
movement, maintenance, and safety processes. 262
The introduction of computer-operated cranes and self-driving vehicles has added to the
complexity of cyber issues at port facilities. Accordingly, CG-FAC hired Miter Corporation to
analyze its Cyber Risk Assessment Models to better understand the cyber risks to a port. The
USCG continues to explore information sharing across the maritime enterprise, with a view to
mitigating cyber events. The National Institutes for Standards and Testing (NIST) Cybersecurity
Framework provides guidance on managing cyber threats and risks using a framework of activities,
outcomes and references. It sets the priorities in identifying potential risks, detecting imminent
threats, and protecting critical infrastructure in the cyber realm. 263

5.4 Inter-Sector Security Challenges
The surface transportation supply chain involves multiple economic sectors, from raw materials
through the retail outlet. Multiple transactions are required to bring a product to the consumer.
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The goal of transportation supply chain security is to reduce the known vulnerabilities, so as to
have the capacity to deal with unexpected events. Greater security integration with partners and
third parties is required all along the supply chain. This is based not just on technology but also on
people and processes. When an incident occurs, how well does the security system respond?
Internal security is fine, but there must also be an external data security component. 264 One goal
of the transportation supply chain security system is to protect the victims’ rights, to protect the
facility, and the entity that suffers the security breach. One challenge is to find a security officer
with knowledge of the multi-faceted supply chain systems. Large transportation supply chain
enterprises may form a multi-agency cybersecurity committee that includes the multiple
stakeholders because facilities operators may not be knowledgeable about cybersecurity, while IT
specialists may be unaware of the vulnerabilities in the physical spaces. Indicators of compromise
may be hard to get defined, and experts want to follow the trail of the crime and investigate and
prosecute, not give out information. The result of this failure to communicate is that investigators
often cannot tell what to look for because the victims prize their intellectual property. 265
Stakeholders along the supply chain need to develop interagency “indicators of comprise”
agreements to allow for warnings of future attacks to be shared across the transportation sector.
The USCG has a cyber-response team to assist local commanders in each port. There is also the
regulatory problem of rulemaking about information sharing versus creating guidance. One good
example of cross-sector cooperation is the State of California’s cyber center that has information
sharing protocols with its ports. 266
To what extent can federal or state agencies regulate information sharing about compromises,
breeches and cyber-attacks on the private sector supply chain partners? Should companies train
their staff to audit their company’s internal systems? Is it better to use external third party experts?
What is the trust level between the company staff and the outside auditors? Governments and
small companies may be challenged to keep good cyber auditors at reasonable salaries. Because of
the high cost of cyber expertise, only the oil industry has in-house experts. 267 Shipping companies
use both in-house and third party experts for cybersecurity work. Within the US, the USCG is a
trusted partner, but shipping is international, and other nations may not have a similar trustworthy
agency. How do foreign-owned vessels fit into the information exchange?268
Power Sector
The power sector is another crucial partner in the transportation supply chain security effort.
California has recently experienced several severe wildland-urban interface fire seasons, with loss
of life and property at record levels. The power utility was at fault for several of the fires that were
caused by power line sparking during wind events. To prevent such future events, they have
developed a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) plan that deprives thousands of California
residents and transportation supply chain partners of all power for hours to days. 269
Many elements of the transportation supply chain security enterprise are directly impacted by a
loss of power. Examples include rail crossings warning indicators, railroad signal systems, radio
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systems, including positive train control systems that are essential to prevent accidents on shared
tracks, traffic signals, streetlights and freeway signage. PSPS created generator requirements for
sensitive facilities, has direct impacts on hazardous materials pipelines that carry fuel to airports
and distribution points, including point of sale for trucking, as well as passenger cars. Cell phones
and telecommunication systems rely on electricity to function. Many aspects of land transportation
share the same cyber management approaches that have been described above for maritime
transportation. 270
Each electric utility in California approaches PSPS differently. Pacific Gas and Electric provides
services in the northern half of the state. On October 9, 2019, 750,000 people lost power. Business
impacts, including loss of refrigeration, ATMs, check clearing machines and electronic cash
registers, as well as security systems, were mostly addressed through assistance at the county level.
Between October 23–25, 2019, 500,000 customers were impacted. From October 26 through
November 1, 2019, there was another PSPS. Southern California Edison had 181,000 customers
without power, and San Diego Gas and Electric had 54,000 customers without power. Shared
infrastructure was shut down, and Monterey County lost internet for a week, causing crucial delays
to food shipments, just at the harvest. Altogether, 30 counties were impacted by PSPS in 2019.
including 564 schools that closed, impacting 171,000 students. 271
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activated Emergency Support Functions
(ESF) 6 (mass care) and ESF 8 (public health and medical) to provide shelters and food because
the PSPS created cascading impacts of food shortages. Stores without power did not have the
connections to the distribution centers to notify the shipping department of their deficiencies. The
Bay Area’s Caldecott Tunnel ventilation system shut down because of PSPS, and CO2
accumulated, causing the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) to shut down this
major transportation route until new generator-powered fans could be obtained. Private water
wells did not work unless the owner had a diesel generator, so many people suffered water
shortages, both in the household and for livestock and irrigation.272
California’s rail system also suffered impacts from the PSPS. The safety signals at rail grade
crossings have battery back-ups, but they only have a few days’ life expectancy. When the signals’
back-up power failed, trains had to slow at every crossing. After the first event, the rail operators
often installed generators. While the rail impact is not known to have had direct impacts on the
supply chain, the generators required a coordinated fueling and maintenance system that impacted
rail operations. 273 Power losses have historically lasted for only a few hours, but the 2019 firerelated PSPS events lasted as long as five days,274 causing the grade crossing safety system failures.
As the PSPS continued through fire season, there were not enough generator mechanics for the
30 counties that were impacted. There was no street lighting, so traveling to fix the generators was
a challenge. 275
Motor fuel is a key part of the supply chain system. Trucks move more than 70% of all goods in
the United States or 10.8 billion tons of freight per year. 276 Fuel is generally moved from refineries
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by pipelines to major distribution centers, from which trucks deliver supplies to local point of sale
outlets. Power for the Kinder Morgan pipeline that transports fuel from Rocklin, California to
Reno, Nevada was also shut down by the PSPS,277 so fuel had to be moved to Nevada by truck to
ensure supplies for the trucking industry. Moving fuel by truck is not a long-term solution for fuel
supplies, but generators to power the pipeline would be the size of a semi-tractor trailer truck and
would itself require fuel and maintenance. In the future it would be important to know the
inventory level for point-of-sale access, and to have a plan in place for fuel rationing when pipelines
have to be shut down.
During the 2019 PSPS, generators were used as a temporary measure, but a more sustainable future
solution must be put in place. Refineries developed a fuel backlog because of the PSPS-caused fuel
delivery disruptions and were going to cut production, which would have had impacts across the
supply chain. 278 The port at Humboldt, California, normally receives fuel by barge to the Chevron
distribution point, but it was closed by the PSPS. Trucks from Chico were the only choice to move
fuel into the area. Because motor fuel is a hazardous material, and because the trucks are heavy,
Caltrans had to develop routing on roads and bridges capable of bearing the weight, and the
California Highway Patrol had to escort the trucks for security.279
When PSPS cuts normal sources of power, the generators that are substituted exacerbate the fuel
distribution problems by creating a new demand on the limited supply. Point of sale issues make
the distribution of available fuel a challenge, as the local gas stations and truck stops may have no
battery back-up for pumping gas, and no working cash registers, ATMs, credit card machines, or
check cashing systems to facilitate purchases. While the grocery stores association could say which
stores were open, the fuel outlets were not organized to report functionality. While grocery stores
often have a system in place for cash-only purchases, and many have generators for freezers that
also power cash registers, there are no standards for fuel stations for life safety or community
recovery functions. Communities often do not know which fuel outlets have back-up power and
which outlets need functionality.280
Critical telecommunications systems were also impacted by the lengthy PSPS events during the
fall of 2019. Alerting and warning systems failed in many areas, so community emergency
notifications did not get delivered. When there is no power, there also is no ground-based internet
service. Likewise, cellular phone systems, which also depend on power for the repeaters, did not
function as soon as the emergency power supplies failed. Fewer people have landline service
available since many providers have switched to voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) services only.
Since these “landline” services also depend on power to the internet, over 500,000 people in
California lost all communication systems due to loss of power. It took six days to get wireless
information disseminated and systems operating. Communications providers were worried about
their public image, so the loss of communication was not reported. The greatest public safety
concern was the inability to notify people who needed to evacuate ahead of the fires, forcing first
responders to revert to door-to-door notifications, which are time and resource consuming. For
example, all of Marin County had no power; 57% of cell towers were not working. The loss of the
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internet and cable meant that data and text services were also not working. Land mobile radio
systems used by the public safety professionals worked, but no one else had reliable
communications.281
While the state might have called on neighboring states for mutual aid to supplement the available
emergency power systems, the generators from out of state do not meet the California Air
Resources Board’s (CARB) standards, so the Office of Emergency Services could not bring them
into the PSPS area. Fortunately, critical government functions had emergency power systems, so
county emergency operations centers had communications capability outward to unaffected areas,
using amateur (HAM) radio, satellite, and microwave systems.282
The impact on marine transportation security from the 2019 California PSPS surprised the
USCG. The California command quickly passed the word to the maritime community that
alternative sources of power would be crucial to continued operations. The Port of Oakland used
locomotives as a supplemental power source, for example. 283 There was no direct PSPS impact on
the Port of Oakland, which does not use PG&E and provides most of its own power, but the Port
of Los Angeles/Long Beach did lose power due to the PSPS. Matson has PG&E services, but the
Port of Oakland provides the rest of the power. All container vessels plug into shore power when
they are in port, so it was critical to ensure that alternate sources of power were provided during
the PSPS to preserve the cargoes. 284 The USCG admiral ordered the staff to create an emergency
plan for PSPS. The biggest challenge was determining what critical systems had back-up
generators and a fuel supply chain to continue to support them. They are now looking for a fuel
vendor and supply chain for fuel for critical command functions. The plan has also extended to
contingencies for security when power is lost to the surveillance systems.285
Although not all ports are faced with the likelihood of such widespread commercial power losses,
natural hazards, solar weather impacts 286 in the GPS systems and security threats to the power grid
all generate a need for emergency power planning. 287 Some areas with a high level of lifeline
dependence on the ports have more robust contingency plans. For example, because the port in
Honolulu is a critical asset since most essential goods have to be imported by sea, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) provides backup power for the cranes to ensure that the port can
keep moving. When Hurricane Katrina impacted the New Orleans area in 2005, the US DOT
sent out the ready reserve force vessels to provide support. Two vessels were kept in the Port of
New Orleans and pushed against the dock to provide lighting to support relief operations because
they were the only facilities with lights in the area. The New Orleans Naval Reserve Base kept the
ships refueled. During the early days of limited community public safety control, the ships’ crews
had to break open the small arms lockers to defend the ships against looters. 288
These inter-sector impacts on the surface transportation supply chain have important effects on
security and resilience. NATO has recognized the importance of preventing disasters from
cascading from one critical infrastructure to another. It has established seven principles of
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resilience, which acknowledge the interconnectedness of power, communications, transportation, and
most recently (June 2020), supply chains, which will be discussed in more detail below.289

5.5 Responses to Transportation Supply Chain Security Challenges
The EU STSCS Responses
The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 27 member states, shown in Table 3.
Table 3. European Union Member States
Austria

Italy

Belgium

Latvia

Bulgaria

Lithuania

Croatia

Luxembourg

Cyprus

Malta

Czechia

Netherlands

Denmark

Poland

Estonia

Portugal

Finland

Romania

France

Slovakia

Germany

Slovenia

Greece

Spain

Hungary

Sweden

Source: European Union, 2021.

The Euro is the common currency for 19 of the 27 members. People and goods are able to move
freely within the EU’s Schengen Area, which includes all EU nations and some neighboring
nations and is free of all internal borders. The external borders of the Schengen Area have been
strengthened to ensure the security of the travelers and goods within the open travel area.290
The 27 nations have a combined population of 447 million people, and 11.7 million people
(5.3% of the total workforce) are involved with trade. Each year the EU moves 3,731 billion
metric tons of goods, 50% by road, 31% through ports, and 11% by rail. External trade from
outside of the EU nations uses 73% maritime resources, representing 50% of the value in
goods. Only .8% of the trade goods move by air, but these are high-value items.291
The EU has a robust policy on surface transportation supply chain security. Its Transportation
Security Framework covers all threats from terrorism to graffiti. There is no detailed EU
framework for land transportation—roads, trucks and rail—because there are diverse risks and
threats that have to be managed by the nation in which the goods are located. Crime, valued at a
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loss of 8 billion Euro per year, happens on the premises of transport, such as the use of trucks for
smuggling, human trafficking, theft of cargo and theft of the trucks themselves. When the crime
is within one nation, it is the purview of that nation’s police forces. However, the larger EU “secure
supply chain” initiative includes maritime piracy, international criminal acts and cybercrime. The
initiative covers the roles and responsibilities for operators and third-country partners. The EU’s
maritime transport security plan is based on the ISPS framework, which includes “computer
systems and networks,” and is understood to encompass cybersecurity. The controlling regulation
is the European Union Customs Code, which details the management of cargo at the external
border. 292
The EU has also adopted measures to strengthen the security of its rail systems, especially the
passenger mode, after its vulnerabilities were vividly exposed.
On August 21, 2015, a heavily armed Moroccan national carried out an attack on the high-speed
rail Thalys train traveling from Belgium through northern France. Two American military
personnel and a third colleague who were on vacation overpowered the shooter before he could
kill anyone. Ayoub el Khazzani was convicted of attempted murder and terrorism. 293 This attack
demonstrated the existence of a security gap for passenger rail. In response, a Rail Security
Action Plan was adopted by the European Commission in June 2018, focusing on rail passengers
and staff. They now have metal detectors for rail passengers in larger countries, and smaller
countries use random checks of passengers and baggage to detect weapons. The 2018 Rail
Security Action Plan has seven elements:
1. EU Passenger Rail Security Platform, which is focused on “collecting information on rail
security, on optimizing (sic) the security of cross-border rail services and defining a
coordination mechanism to avoid unilateral decisions at the national level.” 294
2. Common methodology for the assessment of rail security risks.
3. Technical guidance on information to passengers involved in an incident, security
technology and design solutions for enhanced security, staff security procedures and
security training.
4. National contact points on rail security.
5. Implementation of a mechanism at the national level for sharing information on rail
security.
6. National level rail security management.
7. Rail security management plan.
This risk-based approach encourages a proportionate response to emerging threats, keeps
passenger rail services accessible, creates coordination among member states, yet has no binding
requirements. 295 Moreover, even though some of these recommendations are also relevant for
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freight security, this sector continues to possess widely recognized weaknesses. The European
Agency for Railways, for example, recently declared, “European Rail Freight is facing multiple
challenges.” These range from consignment tracing and tracking to the harmonization of national
rules.296
Road security is based in national responsibility, but there is cross border cooperation on
developing common strategies, such as safe and secure parking for trucks, designed to prevent
security threats to drivers at rest stops. The EU nations have collaborated on dangerous goods rules
and on minimum security and service levels for rest stops. The common standards across all EU
nations address sanitation, restaurants and comfort facilities. The EU planning started with a
shortage of 100,000 parking spaces for trucks, which led to unsafe parking habits. The result was
8 billion Euro in theft related to road transport each year. Under the new plan, rest stops were
classified as bronze, silver, gold and platinum levels, allowing truckers to select an appropriate
facility for the value and sensitivity of their cargo. There is still a shortage of 17,000 secure parking
spaces. 297
Another effort to enhance cross border security is the 2019 commercial road security toolkit called
EC Security Guidance for the European Commercial Road Freight Transport Sector. In addition to the
freight theft problem, the trucking sector faces challenges ranging from irregular migrants hiding
in cargo containers to terrorists using trucks as weapons, 298 as happened in Nice, France. 299 The
toolkit was developed by the Directorate General for Mobility and Transport of the European
Union (DG MOVE). The comprehensive guide contains a section for truck drivers, warning
against unscheduled stops and how to manage the stages of the journey, such as pick-up, stopovers
and deliveries. The section for “logistics managers and key stakeholders” describes risk
management and decision making when planning cargo truck journeys. Annexes provide detailed
guidance for specific elements of trucking security, including a checklist for drivers and for
inspecting trucks. 300
Germany, one EU member state, has developed its own Security Strategy for the Freight
Transport and Logistics Industry. The strategy has seven elements, depicted in Table 4.
Table 4. Strategic Elements
Assign roles and responsibilities
Enhance resilience of logistics (resilience = protection, reliability, redundancy, reaction)
Targeted and efficient government actions through risk-based approaches
Promotion of cross-sectoral comprehension of security
Cooperation in spirit of trust and structured dialogue
Improved awareness and knowledge of stakeholders
Continue and extend international cooperation
Source: Benini, 2020.
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While fitting well with the NATO initiatives, these internal guides help the German government
and its critical economic sectors to plan and prepare for disruptions as a way to minimize impacts
on their internal economy and the supply chains in which they participate. 301
Asia Pacific STSCS Responses
The US is a partner in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, which also
focuses on supply chain resilience. It has 21 members, shown in Table 5.
Table 5. APEC Members
Australia

New Zealand

Brunei Darussalam

Papua New Guinea

Canada

Peru

Chile

The Philippines

People’s Republic of China

Russia

Hong Kong, China

Singapore

Indonesia

Chinese Taipei

Japan

Thailand

Republic of Korea

The United States

Malaysia

Viet Nam

Mexico

New Zealand

Source: APEC, 2020.

The organization was formed in 1989 in recognition of the shared economy of the nations around
the Pacific Rim, with a goal of secure growth and regional economic integration. APEC’s focus is
on trade, so they refer to members as “economies” rather than countries. One goal is the
coordination of regulations and standards to facilitate cross border trade among the member
economies to improve “logistics and transport networks to enhance supply chain connectivity.”
They also have a focus on “disaster resilience, planning for pandemics and addressing terrorism.” 302
One focus of their work is on the mitigation of the worldwide economic impacts of disasters.
Researchers have noted that in the US, 43% of businesses impacted by disasters never reopen, and
29% of those that do reopen fail within two years. They also recognize the far-reaching impacts of
disasters. The volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010, for example, impacted the nearby ponies,
European air passengers, auto assembly plants in the US, Germany and Japan, rose growers in
Kenya and manufacturers worldwide, as supply chains were disrupted by the interruption in air
cargo. 303
There are many examples of the integrated economy that has developed around the Pacific Rim.
Ten nations supply parts for the hard drives that are assembled in Thailand, creating multiple
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vulnerabilities in this worldwide supply chain. Thailand is the #2 producer of hard drives in the
world. Floods there in 2017 resulted in a 30% drop in global hard-drive production. Company
losses included $162 million for Sony, $603 million for Canon, and $199 million for Western
Digital.
Recognizing these impacts, APEC has developed Seven Principles of Supply Chain Resilience,
depicted in Table 6.
Table 6. APEC Seven Principles of Supply Chain Resilience
Share information and knowledge to promote supply chain resilience.
Promote disaster risk management and hazard mapping to better understand potential risks to supply chain
resilience.
Support planning and business continuity management to improve global supply chain resilience.
Promote best practice policy, regulations, and flexibility to enable global supply chain resilience.
Leverage regional cooperation to support the supply chain, including coordination with other multinational
organizations working on supply chain resilience inside and outside the APEC region.
Promote critical infrastructure protection and inter-modalism as a key component of supply chain resilience.
Recognize and promote best practices in human resource and capacity management in the context of supply chain
resilience.
Source: Benini, 2020.

These principles help the countries that partner through APEC to develop systems that create a
more resilient internal economy and make them more reliable partners in international supply
chains. 304

5.6 Private Sector Supply Chain Responses: TAPA
Logistics is becoming an ever-larger part of the world economy as supply chains lengthen and
become more complex. In 2000 logistics was 5% of the US economy, but is 8% in 2019. Table 7
shows the value of US logistics operations.
Table 7. Value of US Logistics
Mode

Value

Motor carrier

$668 billion

Parcel

$104.9 billion

Rail

$88.4 billion

Air freight

$76.5 billion

Water & ports

$457 billion

Pipelines

$53 billion

Source: Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals, 2019.
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The logistics sector is evolving in a number of ways that impact supply chain security. Amazon is
one example of a logistics company that uses a business plan with small warehouses across the
nation. As an online retailer, Amazon must deal with goods moving in both directions, with up to
40% of products returned by the consumer. Its main warehouse is staffed using a mix of humans
and robots. The robots cost $1 million each, but each replaces 1,300 human employees. The robots
have a two-year return on investment. 305 Amazon uses third party delivery companies for the last
mile delivery service and plans to deliver some last mile packages using drones in its own Prime
Air fleet. The drones can deliver package under 5 pounds to customers up to 15 miles from the
drone’s base. 306
Goods in the worldwide supply chain are the property of a range of private businesses. The goods
move through several modes of surface transportation: rail, maritime and principally trucks. The
Transported Asset Protection Association (TAPA) is an organization of global manufacturers,
logistics providers, freight carriers, law enforcement agencies, and other stakeholders with the
common aim of reducing losses from international supply chains. In 2014 supply chain crimes
involving luxury goods exceeded 43 million Euro.307 The association’s goal is to protect members’
assets, recognizing that theft of high value, high risk cargo is the biggest supply chain challenge. 308
TAPA sets minimum security standards for various transportation modes, such as its Trucking
Security Requirements (TSR), which include policies and procedures involving certifications from
TAPA or C-TPAT, and practice, which is the physical aspect of the trucks. Facility Security
Requirements (FSR) cover secure warehousing and in-transit storage of goods. Requirements
cover issues such as security systems that integrate X-ray, weight scales, scanners and CCTV.
Environmental considerations include high-value cages and facility access controls. Audits confirm
compliance, and certification for Level A (highest security), B or C will be awarded following each
audit. Producers can then determine the security level needed for the goods and hire shippers based
on their certification level. Law enforcement and regulatory partnerships collaborate to limit cargorelated crime. 309
NATO’s Seven Elements of Resilience Strategy
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed at the end of World War II on
April 4, 1949, through the Treaty of Washington.310 It is a consortium of nations that is designed
to provide collective security for its members. The current member states are listed in Table 8.

MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

68

Table 8. 2020 Membership of NATO
Albania

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Croatia

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Iceland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxemburg

Montenegro

Netherlands

North Macedonia

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

Source: NATO, Member states, August 31, 2020.

Originally formed to combat the potential for aggression against European nations by the former
Soviet Union, today the Alliance provides broad-ranging crisis support to its member states.
Guidance is provided for members states across a variety of threats, including cybersecurity, energy
security, counter-terrorism, and most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic. 311 Article 3 of the
founding treaty required every member to engage in preparedness to resist armed attack. Today
this concept recognizes that civil systems such as utilities, transportation, cyber systems and
support of the population are critical to responding to any threat, whether from a natural hazard,
technological failure or intentional attack. 312
Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty is the commitment to collective defense. Although designed
to bring the Allies together to defend a member state that was being invaded or attacked by the
former Soviet Union, Article 5 was actually invoked for the first time after the United States was
attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001. Resilience is a cornerstone of the collective defense
concept, ensuring that each member state is able to recover from any event quickly to maintain its
role in the Alliance. 313
Recognizing that a collective defense military action requires the ongoing support of civilian assets,
NATO has developed a resilience strategy to ensure that “basic government functions can continue
during emergencies or disasters, in peacetime or in periods of crisis.” 314 At its 2016 meeting,
NATO issued the Warsaw communique, which stated that NATO had developed the Baseline
Requirements for National Resilience, which included “continuity of government, continuity of
essential services, the security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with
civilian means.” 315 To achieve these goals, NATO has created seven elements of resilience, as
shown in Table 9.
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Table 9. NATO Resilience Requirements
Requirement 1: Assured
Continuity of
Government and Critical
Government Services

Requirement 2: Resilient
Energy Supply

Requirement 3: Ability to
Deal Effectively with
Uncontrolled Movement
of People

Requirement 5: Ability to
Deal with Mass
Casualties

Requirement 6: Resilient
Civil Communication
Systems

Requirement 7: Resilient
Civil Transport Systems

Requirement 4: Resilient
Food and Water
Resources

Source: Benini, 2020.

NATO took a three-step process approach to achieving the resilience requirements among all
member states. While nations such as the US and the United Kingdom (UK) have long-standing
systems for managing civil defense and disaster response, not all member states had well
understood government-based systems in place when the process started. Nations each conducted
a self-assessment process that was completed by 2017. In 2018 experts from the Alliance met to
discuss the key role of critical infrastructure elements and their interdependencies in the
achievement of resilience. Transportation resilience was a key issue in the discussions. 316 Based on
the gaps discovered by the self-assessments, NATO provided technical assistance to the Allies
between 2018 and 2019. The member states then reassessed their capabilities after receiving the
technical assistance, and their updated capabilities were reviewed by experts between 2019 and
2020. Status reports were then to be issued to national leaders in 2020, 317 but COVID-19
challenges intervened. At the Defense Ministers’ meeting on June 18, 2020, resilience baseline
Requirement 7 had the element of security of supply chains added, recognizing the demands of
the COVID-19 response. 318
The NATO framework offers a multi-national view on how global surface transportation systems
should be secured. Coordinating across sectors in a public-private partnership offers the best hope
for the security of the transportation of critical goods needed for national security and economic
progress. The framework might provide guidance for the surface transportation supply chain
security enterprise.
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VI. Analysis of the Workshop Findings
The discussion of the workshop presentations presented above allows us to highlight the following
issues that public and private decision-makers must grapple with in their ongoing efforts to
enhance the security and resilience of global supply chain surface transportation systems.

6.1 Complex Relationships
The modern surface transportation supply chain involves a complex web of relationships involving
private enterprise and a variety of government entities in multiple nations. While the
transportation modes are mostly privately owned, and the goods in the supply chain are also mostly
privately owned, the security regulations are developed and enforced by either private entities such
as APEC and TAPA or by numerous governmental entities from the USCG, USCBP, and the
EU to the customs agents in small nations. Managing supply chain transportation systems is
further complicated by the multi-national ownership of many facilities. To cite but two examples,
some of Rotterdam’s terminals are owned by the Danish company, Maersk Shipping, while some
US ports are owned by Chinese or Dubai-based entities.

6.2 Diverse Supply Chains
Management of the supply chain requires different levels of support for different products and
services. Supply chains include a rich variety of products ranging from critical medicines to
Christmas lights, often in the same cargo container. Some hazardous materials are labeled and
provided with special handling, while lithium batteries and butane lighters may be shipped in a
mixed goods load in a container with flammable items such as clothing or books. Containers are
stacked above and below the deck level, making it difficult or impossible to check the condition of
the containers in transit. Refrigerated containers require shore power when in port, but it may not
be possible to check the individual connections for all containers. The US FDA requires advanced
notice of the arrival of goods under its purview to permit scheduling of inspections, while other
containers from the same ship may include high tech components or children’s toys and move
through the port based on C-TPAT inspections in the country of origin.
The foreign origin of materials further complicates the required actions in the port. Cargo
containers of essential goods such as medical masks, gowns and gloves may need to be expedited
through inspections and ground-based shipping during a pandemic. Pharmaceuticals may require
expedited FDA inspections to reach critical points of distribution.
Adulteration of products made outside of the US is another security concern that may go far back
in the supply chain. While the US FDA inspects food and drug products coming into the country,
they do not test the contents of each box. In 2008 more than 20 people died and over 400 were
sickened by tainted heparin, which is made from pig intestines. The US FDA inspects the foreign
plants in which the dried heparin is made, but in 2008 a pig disease in China forced heparin plants
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to buy pig parts from smaller, uninspected workshops where the pig intestines were harvested.
Once the material was created in the pharmaceutical plants, it was inspected, but the tainting was
a result of the use of improperly obtained raw material. How far back in the supply chain should
security go?

6.3 Crime and the Need for STSCS
Goods in the supply chain require different types of security. Inexpensive goods may be tagged
under C-TPAT in a foreign port, and not be opened again until they reach their destinations.
High value goods may travel under bond, or be diverted in the shipping process by criminal
enterprises. Theft of cargo was identified as an 8 billion Euro business in the European Union.
APEC recognizes that criminal enterprise is a constant threat to the supply chain, since 1 pallet of
Xbox machines buys the thief a BMW X5. Substitution of counterfeit products at the point of
origin or at the point that the cargo container is opened also generate illegal income. 319
Modern piracy was brought to the world’s attention with the 2009 boarding of the Maersk
Alabama by Somali pirates. Since then, armed security guards have been added to merchant ships,
and the navies of the world have created patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to deter
further attacks. Ships now sail further from the coast to make the trip too far for local pirates in
small boats. But security experts have noted that while piracy off the Somali coast has diminished
in the past ten years, piracy still persists in places such as Nigeria. The Straits of Malacca and parts
of Indonesia are especially attractive areas for pirates since the shipping lanes are too narrow to
permit ships to avoid them. 320

6.4 Availability of Goods
Supply chain security may also be impacted by the availability of goods. Scarce goods, such as
protective equipment and ventilators in a pandemic, may demand a higher level of access control
and supply chain management quality control. Before the pandemic, the loss of a few boxes of
medical gloves would represent a small dollar-value loss, but in the winter of 2020, the scarcity of
such medical supplies was a life safety issue around the world, greatly raising their value. Thus,
since consumers were willing to pay more for medical personal protective equipment (PPE),
suppliers were able to spend more on their security and still make a profit.
Labor actions can also impact the availability of goods and surface transportation supply chain
security. In 2015, 27 US west coast ports closed for four days in a labor dispute. Even such a short
stoppage created supply chain havoc. During the strike, US buyers and port facility managers
ramped up security provisions to ensure that the labor dispute did not impact the security of the
goods in transit. The strike was estimated to cost $1.9 billion per day and to require up to eight
weeks for deliveries to return to normal at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, the primary
container port for Asian goods. Even before the strike, ships had to anchor out for up to ten days
awaiting berths and logistics support. 321
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6.5 Cyber Issues in STSCS
The US Department of Defense (DOD) is the world’s largest logistics organization. Threats to
the DOD supply chain include cyber threats, counterfeit goods, and the shrinking American
industrial base that pushes purchasing offshore. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) serves both
military units and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The DLA obtains
materials from a prime contractor, but the components may come from various sources in different
nations, “so it is difficult to certify the security of second and third-tier suppliers.” 322 Cyber
processes are a critical part of managing the logistics enterprise. Protection includes placing all
processes behind the DOD firewall, understand the role of cyber in the supply chain, and training
employees to recognize and avoid phishing attacks. Yet, such measures need constant vulnerability
assessments, for even the most highly classified systems can be breached, as indicated by the
successful introduction of the Sunburst malware into the cyber systems of numerous private
organizations (including technology companies) and government agencies (including DHS, State,
the military and the NSA) sometime in late 2019 or early 2020. 323
Cybersecurity is especially critical at sea. Modern ships are largely computer-controlled. Malware
introduced into the navigation system could leave a ship blind and subject to navigation hazards,
getting lost at sea, or colliding with another vessel. Systems that manage ballast could be spoofed
to cause listing or even capsizing.
Ports rely on cyber systems to schedule ship arrivals to coincide with the availability of cranes and
land side transportation. Cranes may be computer operated, along with self-driving vehicles
serving port operations. VOIP and wireless systems are critical communications assets. All of these
systems are subject to tampering through a variety of cyber-attacks. Preventing interference with
critical cyber systems is a constant challenge for surface supply chain security management.

6.6 Natural World Changes
After centuries of being frozen, the fabled northwest passage sought by Henry Hudson is opening
as the Arctic Sea experiences 75 ice-free days each year. Russia has developed its northern slope as
a natural resources center, creating a demand for supply chains to connect these new resources to
ports such as Rotterdam and Yokohama. Cruise ships and military vessels transit the Bering Strait’s
narrow passage, raising the specter of maritime traffic jams in summer.
The melting Arctic poses numerous supply chain security challenges. The primary concern is the
management of the overlapping areas of national interest created by the UN Treaty on the Law of
the Sea. While China, Russia and Canada are signatories, the US is not. What will this mean for
enforcement of mineral rights, rights of innocent passage, or use of natural resources such as fish?
Concerns have also been raised about the safety of the pristine environment from ship accidents
and potential oil spills.
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Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany face overlapping economic zones with each
other, and with Russia on the Eurasian side of the ocean. How will the opening of this northern
access point impact historic European trade ports such as Rotterdam and Kiel? What changes will
it make to trade routes as Russian North Slope ports become available to serve inland areas of
Russia and Eastern Europe?

6.7 The Blueprint: Research into STSCS
The factors discussed above reflect the complex security challenges that the evolving surface
transportation supply chains, which are global in reach, diverse in goods, and threatened by natural,
human-caused and technological events, must confront. Suppliers, consumers, logistics companies
and governments all have a stake in developing systems and technologies to ensure that STSCS is
maintained to guarantee the integrity of products that move across the world. Geopolitical
challenges from the melting Arctic and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative join and enhance
transitional concerns such as theft prevention as focus areas for research.
Identifying these challenges provided the information necessary to achieve the primary goal of the
workshop—the creation of a blueprint to be used by researchers wanting to enlarge knowledge of
STSCS and to create systems and technologies to enhance supply chain transportation security. It
can benefit researchers and funders by providing some guidance for focused research with
immediately applicable benefits. This blueprint is the work of every member of the workshop and
is published as Appendix A of this report.
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VII. Conclusion
Though numerous practical obstacles have been identified in any effort to enhance the security of
supply chain transportation systems, the above analysis clearly indicates the need for more research
in numerous areas. In addition to new research on numerous security aspects of various
transportation sectors, the policy area deserves special attention. Essentially, research is needed to
enhance the understanding of (1) the degree to which relevant government organizations interact
in developing and implementing policies nationally, sub-nationally and internationally and their
effectiveness, and (2) the degree to which supply chains have adopted and implemented relevant
and effective security measures.
These topics have emerged because the literature has demonstrated that little is known about the
degree to which the US government has developed an integrated and effective policy approach to
such critical areas as cybersecurity. Furthermore, it has reflected the fundamental difference in the
concerns of the private sector that operates the transportation systems and the supply chains
generally and those of the government. Articles written with a private sector focus generally reflect
a desire to protect business interests by eliminating internal risks and redundancy. Yet, it must be
recognized that there is also a growing recognition of the importance of such issues as pollution,
sustainability and resilience.
Accordingly, although supply chain operators are interested in using emerging technologies, such
as automated vehicles, drones, and improved tracking and GPS software, their concern is on how
to improve their ability to track goods and transfer them as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Security-related issues are narrowly defined and include integrating emerging technology
effectively, managing and integrating supply chain transportation with other supply chain nodes,
achieving rapid freight flows and minimizing theft, and risk to their customers and/or investors.
The ways these priorities impact security is evidenced by the maritime industry’s cyber situation.
The difference with the government’s security priorities is obvious. It is focused broadly on the
external risks to all aspects of supply chain transportation systems, and emphasizes security
measures that will protect them against the ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to exploit
legitimate supply chains for illegal operations or to sabotage them in ways, which would endanger
societal functioning and national security. Yet though the US government has successfully
developed and implemented effective policies in some areas, the extent to which it has done so and
its ability to do so in others remains unclear.
It has issued numerous publications that relate to mitigating general and specific supply chain risks.
However, it is not at all clear to what extent these have been implemented, and it is difficult to
measure their success. However, it is safe to say that a major obstacle to achieving higher levels of
transport security is the inherent difficulty in overcoming the differing goals of the private and
public sectors.
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The result of such differences is particularly evident in the cybersecurity realm. Although supply
chain companies have been integrating emerging cyber and related information technologies into
their transportation systems, few, especially (as we have emphasized) in the maritime sector, have
been eager to pay for recommended security measures.
Enhancing the knowledge of these issues, including the functioning of the government and its
relationship with the supply chain organizations and their transportation systems, will facilitate
the creation of a proactive environment that will facilitate the emergence of the necessary
cooperative action among all the governmental and intergovernmental organizations and with the
private sector. As we have seen, this will be no simple matter, yet the literature survey that was
have carried out reveals that there is widespread agreement on the need for action and numerous
suggestions regarding policies that should be implemented. The next step is clearly to build on
existing knowledge and to fill the critical gaps identified above.
However, even this will not suffice, for this is a rapidly changing world. Accordingly, it is also
essential to develop a deeper understanding of the nature of the global environment and the ways
in which the six macro challenges identified above will influence supply chain transportation
systems in the years to come.
Figure 8.

Supply Chain Macro Challenges
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If global economic networks are to function securely and effectively for future generations, the
implications of these factors for transportation systems must be understood, and appropriate
policies developed and implemented.
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Appendix A: Blueprint for Future Research
As a result of the STSCS Workshop presentations and discussions, the participants in the Delphi
process jointly developed a blueprint for future research in the field. There is a great deal of
literature on many aspects of the supply chain, but very little on the role of transportation security
in the supply chain or on how transportation security’s performance is critical to supply chain
security overall. As the bibliographies demonstrate, research on the security of individual modal
elements of the supply chain is well-developed, but there is little on the intersection of
transportation security with the supply chain’s operations. While the workshop was focused on
surface transportation modes of maritime, road and rail, the areas identified as needing further
research may equally apply to aviation transportation supply chain security.
The blueprint provides an outline of issues and topics that would benefit from further research.
Some of them have not been investigated at all from a transportation security perspective. Others
have been studied at an earlier time but are newly influenced by changing technology, geo-political
activities or management strategy changes.

OVERARCHING ISSUES
1. Supply chain itself, or environments in which supply chains operate
a. Mechanics of the supply chain’s transportation security, from origin to
destination
b. Arctic Ocean’s evolving trade routes
c. China’s Belt and Road initiatives in the Eastern Hemisphere and South Pacific
d. Maritime management.
e. Road and rail innovations and security
2. Ranking of supply chains in national security? Or what are the most important US
supply chains?
a. Economically?
b. Strategically—criteria?
c. National defense (Jones Act), to ensure that the “Fourth Arm of Defense” of
the merchant marine extends to both sides of the waterborne transit
d. Resiliency—criteria? Hazards that must be addressed to ensure resiliency
e. Redundancy as a solution
f. Rapidly employable alternatives
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE

78

g. Distributed sources for critical goods
3. Who is responsible for transportation supply chain security?
a. Range of responsibilities
b. Degree of cooperation and collaboration within the transportation elements of
the supply chain
c. Criteria for transportation supply chain security? Use adoption of ISO
28000:2007 as an indicator? (see https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#is o:std:iso:2
8000:ed-1:v1:en)
4. Organizational learning capacity
a. Conflict between minimal staff, standardized systems and economic
environment.
b. How to cope with the conflicts?

TOPICAL AREAS
1. Define supply chains, including the transportation assets
a. Military
b. Commercial
c. Sector: Essential Commodities – National Security/Emergency Management/
Public Health
i. Water
ii. Fuel
iii. Medical
iv. Food
v. Energy: pipelines and electricity
vi. Communications
2. Defining supply chain security-position in the supply chain (prime, support,
subcontractor)
a. Where resilience fits in security
b. Role of JIT in resilience—having things there when you need them
c. Development of resilience metrics for complex systems in STSCS
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d. Application of National Academy of Sciences measures of resilience in
engineering to resilience in the STSCS sector
e. Difference among/interaction of safety, security and emergency management
3. Threats and risks to material and information supply chain
a. Analytical frameworks for supply chain managers?
b. How to quantify risks?
c. Internal threats, single point failure, layered defense
d. Comparing the impact (cost) of disruption of supply chains versus the cost of
restoration of those supply chains (i.e., balancing preventive measures and
reactive measures)
4. Supply chain governance- what are the laws, regulations, standards?
a. International
b. National
c. State
d. Local governments
e. Supply chain manager, e.g., Amazon
f. Trade associations, e.g., Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
5. Supply chain governance – what are the strengths and weaknesses: from the
perspective of government/ supply chain manager/ trade association?
a. International
b. National
c. State
d. Local governments
e. Supply chain manager, e.g., Amazon
f. Trade association., e.g., Association for Supply Chain Management (ASCM)
g. Inter-agency, inter-governmental, international
6. National Highway System (NHS), Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET) and
Strategic Rail Corridor Network (STRACNET)
a. Evaluating the criteria for construction and route selection for current relevance
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b. Military bases—locations have changed
c. Military support to civil authority
d. Civil support to military
7. Use NATO standards of quantification and accountability to evaluate specific surface
transportation supply chain resiliency as an element of security
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49158.htm
8. All hazards supply chain resilience development
a. Impact of ESF 14: Cross Sector Business and Infrastructure, 2019
b. Use of pass down log to capture lessons and best practices [military turn-over
file model]
c. Use of temporary but redundant supply routes and hubs to make the system
more resilient during crisis
d. Impact of disease on supply chains—loss of workers, changing demands, impact
on transportation modes
9. What areas and to what degree do you need international cooperation and agreements
for transportation supply chain security?
a. European Union
b. International Maritime Organization, International Ship and Port Code
c. United Nations’ Conventions
d. International regulations for the carriage of dangerous goods for the security of
the cargo
10. Growing dependence on information flows within supply chains [physical and
cybersecurity]
a. Physical security of undersea cables and landing stations
b. E-commerce
c. Blockchain, Tradelens (IBM/Maersk)
d. Autonomous vehicles
e. SCADA
f. Logistics
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g. Data governance for enhanced trust in supply chain information exchanges, the
benefits of mainstreaming cyber-hygiene in transportation
11. Periods of transition and the vulnerabilities that they create for surface transportation
supply chains and security challenges
a. Physical supply chains
b. Information supply chains
c. Ports, stations as points of access and vulnerability
d. Vessels in operation
12. Leveraging emerging technologies for multiple applications
a. Using GPS for goods tracking and security oversight
b. Using various streams of information for validation to support decision making
13. Better communication linkages to create resilient supply chain transportation security
a. Cross-industry/supplier
b. Language issues—among crew members
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Appendix B: Workshop Participant Biographies
Janet Benini’s career began with the California Office of Emergency Services, where she led
program development for the California Specialized Training Institute and was a responder during
major disasters such as the Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes. She transitioned to the US
Department of Transportation emergency management office in 1998 and was its Deputy Director
during the 9/11 attacks. She led development of the National Response Plan at the White House,
and developed the “Principles of Supply Chain Resilience” for the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation group (APEC), the topic of her dinner speech.
Jan is an adjunct professor at George Washington University, and she continues to work as a Civil
Transportation Expert for NATO. She is co-Principal Investigator for the Transportation
Research Board’s (TRB) NCHRP project that caps a 20-year effort to improve transportation
resilience and will develop a playbook and training program for all State DOTs.
Commander Greg Callaghan is currently the Chief of Prevention for the Eleventh Coast Guard
District, covering California, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona. His previous assignments include
Commanding Officer and Executive Officer of Marine Safety Unit Texas City, the Office of Port
and Facility Compliance at Coast Guard Headquarters. There, he was also the Coast Guard
representative to the US and Canada Bi-National Maritime Security Working Group.
Commander Callaghan was also assigned to Sector Boston, MA and Marine Safety Office Miami,
FL.
Commander Callaghan’s education includes a Bachelor of Science degree from the State
University of New York Maritime College, a Master’s in Public Administration and Certification
in Port and Maritime Administration from Old Dominion University, and a Master’s in National
Security and Resource Strategy from the National Defense University’s Eisenhower School.
LCDR Robert Cole serves as the Port and Facilities Activities Section Chief at Coast Guard
Pacific Area. His prior assignments include Sector San Diego as the Waterways Management
Division Chief, Sector Mobile in the Inspections Division, and Sector Houston-Galveston in the
Vessel Traffic Service. Prior to joining the Coast Guard, LCDR Cole served in the US Navy for
nearly seven years.
LCDR Cole’s assignments have been in support of the Coast Guard’s Prevention mission, which
provides port and waterway management oversight and coordination, and ensures that vessels and
facilities comply with applicable regulatory requirements, all in support of the safety and security
of the nation’s ports and waterways. In regard to cybersecurity, as a result of the June 2017 APMMaersk ransomware event, his office was tasked to prepare guidance detailing how subordinate
units should manage and respond to cybersecurity events in the Marine Transportation System.
Frances Edwards, M.U.P., Ph.D., CEM, is a professor and director of the Master of Public
Administration program at San José State University. She is also Deputy Director of the
National
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Transportation Security Center at the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI). She is a Certified
Emergency Manager with over 20 years’ experience in California. She is editor of Housing Recovery
After Disasters, co-author with Dan Goodrich of Introduction to Transportation Security, and two
books on terrorism with Fritz Steinhausler of the University of Salzberg, twelve major publications
for MTI, and more than 40 articles and book chapters. She provides emergency management
planning and training for Caltrans and Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority and gives
frequent media talks, conference presentations and public education seminars in Silicon Valley.
She has provided leadership for two NATO Advanced Research Workshops and consulted with
the European Union.
Frances has a master’s degree in political science (international relations) from Drew University,
a Master of Urban Planning and a PhD in public administration from New York University,
and a certificate in hazardous materials management from the University of California, Irvine.
She is a FEMA-certified instructor for the ICS course suite and a California Specialized
Training Institute outreach instructor.
Dan Goodrich, MPA, CEM, MEP, is the Senior Transportation Security Scientist with the
Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) at San José State University and the instructor for
“Security Issues for Transportation Professionals” in the College of Businesses’ Master of Science
in Transportation Management program. He is a Certified Emergency Manager, a Master
Exercise Practitioner, a Professional Continuity Practitioner and a Certified Security
Specialist. He is co-author with Frances Edwards of Introduction to Transportation Security,
nine major research publications for MTI, as well as a variety of professional articles and book
chapters. He provides emergency management planning and training support to Caltrans
and Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority. He has participated in two NATO
Advanced Research Workshops and consulted with the European Union.
Dan has a master’s degree in public administration from San José State University. He is a FEMAcertified instructor for the ICS course suite and a California Specialized Training Institute
outreach instructor. He has worked at county government and in the private sector, and has sixteen
years’ military service, including US Marine Corps Security Forces and US Army Reserve Military
Police.
Kevin Krick serves as Matson’s Senior Director, Safety, Quality, Environment, & Security
(SQES). As a department head reporting directly to the president, Kevin is responsible for all
initiatives and aspects of SQES compliance programs for the Matson companies. Overseeing a
geographically diverse department that serves vessels, terminals, and supply chain operations
throughout the Pacific, SQES oversees physical security and supports cybersecurity initiatives as
well as the monitoring of the carriage of dangerous goods.
In addition, Kevin serves as the Designated Person Ashore and is a board member of both the
Chamber of Shipping of America and the Smithsonian Environmental Research Center advisory
board. Previously, he served as a Presidential appointee to the US Maritime Administration and
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is currently a Captain in the United States Navy Reserve in the Strategic Sealift Program. Early in
his career, as a dual license graduate of the US Merchant Marine Academy, Kevin sailed aboard
tankers for most of the 1990s. He has an M.S., Marine Policy from the University of Delaware
College of Marine Studies.
Liz Lange, MPA, is a graduate of the San José State University Master
of Public Administration program and was Vice President of the MPA Student Association. Liz’s
final project for the degree is a comparative benchmark analysis of Façade Improvement Programs
(FIP) in the Bay Area. She hopes that this inventory and analysis of programs will allow other
cities a set of common practices and trends and encourage them to start their own FIP. As
a research assistant for this project, Liz assisted with developing a bibliography of relevant work on
surface transportation supply chain security that will be used to support future practical research in
the field. She provided logistics support to the workshop and assistance with the workshop report
preparation.
Herby Lissade, P.E., is the Principal Transportation Engineer at the California Department of
Transportation, serving as Assistant Division Chief overseeing the Offices of Maintenance,
Technical and Field Support, Storm Water and Environmental Compliance, Emergency
Management and Technical Field Support, ITS and Roadway Maintenance, Radio
Communications, and Roadside Management. Previously Herby was Chief, Office of Emergency
Management for ten years. He also worked in District 7 (Los Angeles) as a Senior Engineer. He
started his career with the New York State Department of Transportation’s construction division
in New York City. He is a licensed Professional Civil Engineer in California and graduated from
The Pratt Institute.
Herby is the Chair of three National Cooperative Highway Research Program Project Panels and
an international expert on emergency management and transportation, speaking at conferences in
China and Japan. Following the devastating Haiti earthquake of 2010, Mr. Lissade formed the
non-profit Haiti Engineering and is the President. Haiti Engineering is supported by Caltrans
professionals of all classifications, brought together to provide technical assistance to the people
and government of Haiti.
Commander Rom Matthews currently serves at the US Coast Guard Eleventh District in
Alameda, California, as the Chief of Contingency Planning. Under the direction of the Eleventh
District Commander, his duties include oversight of the Eleventh District and four major field
commands’ contingency plans, including the Area Maritime Security Plan, Maritime
Transportation System Recovery Plan and multiple field unit all-hazard contingency plans.
Commander Matthews is in his 25th year of service. He has served in a variety of domestic and
overseas assignments, including high seas maritime law enforcement, foreign and domestic port
operations and security and maritime search and rescue. He supported the global war on terror as
a Foreign Port Security Advisor deployed to over 50 foreign countries assisting foreign
governments in securing the global supply chain against acts of terrorism.
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Colonel Mitch Medigovich (CANG, Ret.) has 37 years in public service. Currently, he serves as
Deputy Director for California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), overseeing Public Safety
Communications, Information Technology Operations, and Disaster Logistical Operations. He
was appointed by Governor Brown to Cal OES in December 2012 and reappointed by Governor
Newsom. Col. Medigovich is a decorated combat veteran with numerous medals and citations.
His final assignment was as Chief of Staff to the California Military Department. He has directly
led and supported response efforts for the state in sixteen Presidential Disaster Declarations since
2013, including historic wildfires, major earthquakes, and devastating floods across 55 counties.
Col. Medigovich earned his Bachelor of Science from CSU Sacramento, a Master of Business
Administration from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, and a Master of Arts in Strategic
Studies from the United States Army War College.
Gzim Ocakoglu is, since mid-August 2019, First Counsellor on Mobility and Transport at the
Delegation of the European Union to the United States of America. His role is to support and
promote EU-US transport cooperation and dialogue and facilitate the exchange of information on
transport issues between the European Commission and the US authorities, as well as with the
relevant international organizations, private sector representatives and professional organizations.
In the European Commission for more than 16 years, Gzim has extensive experience in transport
policymaking, developing and implementing rules and legislation in maritime transport and
logistics (from 2017 to 2019), in aviation and air traffic management (from 2013 to 2017), and in
Intelligent Transport Systems (from 2008 to 2013). In his most recent position in DG MOVE
(Deputy Head of Unit “Maritime Transport and Logistics”), Gzim was also Chairman of the
Digital Transport & Logistics Forum (http://www.dtlf.eu), a Commission expert group
addressing the challenges of the digitalization in logistics chains.
Before joining the Commission in 2003, for ten years, Gzim held various research and
management positions in the telecom industry, working for both equipment manufacturers and
telecom operators. He holds a MS degree in Electro-Mechanical Engineering from the Université
Libre de Bruxelles and a MS in Electrical Engineering from the University of Minnesota.
Ash Padwal, PE, JD is the Chief Risk Officer for Allied Telesis, Inc. (ATI). ATI designs,
manufactures, sells and supports high performance information technology infrastructures for
healthcare, aerospace, defense and transportation companies around the world, including US,
Canada, Mexico, Europe and South America.. In this capacity, Ash is responsible for oversight of
the legal, regulatory affairs, corporate governance and risk management activities of the company.
He is also a founding Trustee of the University of California, Merced Foundation. Ash holds a JD
from Santa Clara University and a BE in Telecom Engineering from University of Poona in India,
and completed graduate work in Industrial and Systems Engineering at San José State University.
Manny Raras has worked for the US Coast Guard for the past thirty-five years, both as an activeduty officer and a civilian employee. He has served in a wide variety of professional fields, including
naval engineering, training, operations, international affairs, and intelligence. He currently
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manages the Geopolitical Section of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center
Pacific. He is responsible for providing information and analysis to Coast Guard executives
regarding issues and events that impact Coast Guard Operations throughout the Pacific and Polar
regions. As the Director of International Relations in the Pacific, he planned and coordinated
engagement activities with foreign agencies to promote cooperation on strategic maritime issues.
He negotiated a historic agreement between Coast Guards from Japan, China, Russia, South
Korea, Canada and the United States that established areas of cooperation and guidelines on
information sharing between them.
As the Director of Contingency Exercises, he managed the Coast Guard’s conting ency exercise
program throughout the Pacific, including all major Homeland Security and Homeland Defense
exercises. As the Deputy Chief of Detection and Monitoring Operations for Joint Interagency
Task Force West, he managed all Department of Defense counter drug operations throughout the
Pacific. As a result of his efforts, Task Force West seized 40 metric tons of cocaine worth $700
million.
Manny graduated from the United States Coast Guard Academy, earning a Bachelor of Science
in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.
Joseph Szyliowicz, PhD, is Professor Emeritus at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
Denver University and the Founder of its Intermodal Transportation Institute. He has received
numerous awards for his research activities and been a visiting fellow at St Antony’s College,
Oxford University, and the Institute for Advanced Studies and the Harry Truman Institute at
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, among others. He has served as the International Co-Chair of the
Sustainable Transportation Task Force of the China Council for International Cooperation and
Environmental Development (2003–2008), has been a member of the US delegation to the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation’s Intermodal Transportation Working Group (2001–2007) and
has participated in several NATO Advanced Research Workshops.
Professor Szyliowicz has published extensively on transportation security issues, most recently coediting and co-authoring a series of comparative analyses of maritime, intermodal and aviation
security. He is currently co-editing a special issue on freight transport security for Transportation
Reviews. His PhD is in Political Science and Government from Columbia University in New York
City.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
9/11

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States

AI

Artificial Intelligence

AIS

Automatic Identification System (USCG)

APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ATM

Automated Teller Machine (banking)

BRI

People’s Republic of China One Belt, One Road Initiative

BSR

Business Social Responsibility

Cal OES

California Office of Emergency Services

Caltrans

California Department of Transportation

CANG

California National Guard

CAPT

Captain

CBP

US Customs and Border Patrol

CCTV

Closed Circuit Television (security cameras)

CDR

Commander

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CG-791

USCG Office of Cyberspace Forces

CG FAC

USCG Office of Port and Facility Compliance

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

COL

Colonel

COSCO

Chinese Overseas Shipping Company (People’s Republic-based shipping and
port owner)

COVID-19

Corona Virus Disease, 2019, the cause of a worldwide pandemic

CSSA

Co-Sector Specific Agencies

C-TPAT

Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism

DHS

Department of Homeland Security
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DEA

US Drug Enforcement Administration

DG MOVE

Directorate General for Mobility and Transport of the European Union

DLA

Defense Logistics Agency (DOD)

DOD

US Department of Defense

EC

European Commission

ECDIS

Electronic Chart Display and Information System

ESF

Emergency Support Function (FEMA), part of the National Response
Framework

EU

European Union

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation

FDA

US Food and Drug Administration

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

FSR

Facility Security Requirements (TAPA)

GAO

Government Accountability Office

GCC

Government Coordinating Councils

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

GHG

Greenhouse Gasses

GPS

Global Positioning System

HMM

Hyundai Merchant Marine

IMO

United Nations’ International Maritime Organization

IOT

Internet of Things, refers to connected appliances, electronics and motor
vehicles

ISPS

International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

ISTEA

Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act

I-STEP

Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program

IT

Information Technology

LCD

Least Developed Countries

LCDR

Lieutenant Commander
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LNG

Liquefied Natural Gas

LRIT

Long Range Identification and Tracking system (IMO)

MTSA

Maritime Transportation Security Act

MTI

Mineta Transportation Institute

NATO

North American Treaty Organization

NAVTEX

NAVigational TEleX, a direct printing warning system for ships

NIST

National Institutes for Standards and Testing

NOAA

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NTC

National Targeting Center (CBP)

NVIC

Naval Vessel Inspection Circular (USCG)

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

OOI

Orient Overseas International (Hong Kong-based port owner)

PSPS

Public Safety Power Shutoff (California)

Ret.

Retired

RFID

Radio Frequency Identification

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, a combination of hardware and
software that uses computers to control processes

SCRM

Supply Chain Risk Management

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

STSCS

Surface Transportation Supply Chain Security

TAPA

Transportation Asset Protection Association

TEU

Twenty-foot equivalent unit, a measure of cargo container capacity of a cargo
container ship

TSA

Transportation Security Administration (DHS))

TSR

Trucking Security Requirements (TAPA)

TWIC

Transportation Workers Identification Card

UN

United Nations

US

United States
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USB

Universal Serial Bus, a type of computer connection

USCG

Unites States Coast Guard

US DOT

United States Department of Transportation

VOIP

Voice Over Internet Protocol (computer-based phone system)

WTO

World Trade Organization
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